18 Oct 2017
The application for leave to appeal was refused because the judge’s reference to 'breach of trust' was properly read in a wider sense as abuse of the documentary credit/loan system rather than a classic breach of trust, and the resulting sentence of 44 months (after plea) was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle given the scale, duration and risk of the fraud.
14 Jun 2000
Judge Wright lawfully set a starting point consistent with contemporaneous tariff (citing AG v Chan Sik-ming), discounted it by 20% for a guilty plea delayed by the applicant's three-year absconding, and correctly applied sentencing principles; disparity with sentences imposed by another judge did not show an error of principle, so the four-year sentence was appropriate and must be upheld.
23 Dec 1999
The Court upheld the sentence because the judge adopted the correct five-year starting point, properly considered and weighed the applicant's personal circumstances and plea (granting a full one-third discount), and correctly held that rehabilitation while absconding from bail was of limited mitigating value; therefore the 3 years 8 months sentence was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
12 Aug 1999
The starting point of 12 years for the quantity of heroin involved was correct; because the applicant absconded and his guilty plea was late necessitating a second trial and additional expense, the judge was entitled to reduce the usual one‑third guilty plea discount to one‑quarter; unverified pre‑arrest informant activity did not merit a reduction; accordingly there were no arguable grounds to grant leave to appeal or legal aid and the sentence stands.
27 Mar 1981
Hong Kong courts share the common law discretion to continue a criminal trial in the absence of a defendant who has voluntarily and deliberately absconded while on bail; where the prosecution evidence is complete and the defendant had elected not to give evidence, the court may, in the interests of justice and public interest, order the trial to continue. In this case the 1st defendant voluntarily absconded after the close of the prosecution case and the trial was correctly continued in his absence, subject to the defendant's right to later challenge on grounds of involuntary absence.