20 Nov 2019
Leave to appeal against sentence out of time was granted and an expedited hearing ordered because the applicant had provided substantive assistance to the authorities leading to arrests and prosecutions, the respondent conceded the assistance and that a further reduction was merited, and the issue should therefore be heard on appeal promptly.
17 Dec 2012
The Court held that sentences for the 1st and 2nd applicants were appropriate given their senior roles, large scale and prolonged nature of the frauds and aggravating conduct; delay did not justify reduction; the 3rd applicant warranted a greater discount because her role was subordinate, she had limited education, no direct benefit and provided early assistance, and her sentence was reduced from 9½ to 8½ years with a reordering of one year of Count 10 to be consecutive.
3 Oct 2001
The Magistrate's choice of starting point, the discounts for cooperation and guilty plea, and the application of the totality principle were within proper sentencing discretion; the appellant's personal circumstances and foreignness do not demonstrate that the sentence was excessive, and therefore the appeal is dismissed.
10 Dec 1998
The Court held the sentences were not excessive: a three-year starting point for the conspiracy was appropriate, concurrent sentences were correctly imposed, the one-third plea discount and a six-month reduction for age/health were appropriate, and the custodial sentences of 2.5 years were justified by the seriousness of manufacturing false documentation.
25 Jun 1998
The Court held that the undercover operation did not amount to entrapment so no discount for agent provocateur was warranted, the appropriate starting point was 4 years, allowed limited mitigation (including credit for guilty plea) and concluded the 2-year sentence was not manifestly excessive and should be upheld.
12 Jul 1996
The sentencing judge lawfully applied appropriate starting points, took into account aggravating factors (offending on bail, prior record, international reputational harm) and allowed credit for plea and assistance; the resulting sentence was not manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle, so the application to appeal is dismissed.