26 Aug 2020
The trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments were supported by the evidence; inconsistencies were minor and did not undermine overall reliability; the appellant's unsworn recorded statements and tactical decision not to testify did not compel a different conclusion. Accordingly the elements of s30(1)(a)/(b) were established for counts 2–4 and the convictions stand.
5 Jul 1995
s30(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance is a lawfully prescribed, non‑vague restriction on free expression that is necessary to protect the reputations of suspects and the integrity of bribery investigations (thus protecting public order); the magistrate erred in concluding s30 was repealed and the provision is consistent with the Bill of Rights.
26 Nov 1986
The Court held that 'corrupt practices' in s.12 of the ICAC Ordinance is not confined to the offences listed in s.10; the Commissioner has authority and, in the circumstances, a duty to disclose evidence of corrupt practices to bodies able to take appropriate action (such as the Jockey Club); such disclosure can constitute 'lawful authority' for purposes of s.30 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, and the injunctions and declarations below restraining disclosure were set aside.
25 Jul 1986
The Commissioner may disclose only such information as is necessary to enable the Stewards to deal with corrupt behaviour (i.e. information necessary to prove offences under the relevant ordinances, exemplified by the 4th charge under s9(1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance). S12 does not authorise broad disclosure; s12(b) authorises disclosure only to permit prosecution/disciplinary dealing with corrupt behaviour. All other disclosures of ICAC investigation material absent lawful authority under s12(b) are prohibited and may attract s30 liability; public interest immunity protects no…