21 Aug 2020
The judge was entitled to order part of the trafficking sentence to run consecutively to the manufacturing sentence because manufacturing and arranging distribution were distinct strands of criminality; there was no realistic basis to conclude the applicant was twice punished for the same conduct and the total sentence was not manifestly excessive, therefore leave to appeal was refused.
5 Oct 2005
Leave to appeal was refused because the Court of Appeal's application of the proviso was within accepted norms and there was no substantial and grave injustice from the failure to hold a voir dire; accordingly, even if time were extended, leave would not be granted.
9 Feb 1999
Leave to appeal against sentence out of time was dismissed because the alleged assistance occurred after sentence and after the time for appeal expired, making the appropriate remedy a petition to the Governor/Chief Executive; the claim that the sentence was excessive for a minor role lacked merit.
30 May 1997
The trial judge lawfully applied the relevant guideline range (15–20 years for 400–600 g heroin hydrochloride), properly assessed and generously applied mitigating factors (including guilty pleas and assistance), and the resulting total sentence of 11 years was not open to appellate interference; post-sentencing co-operation should not be taken into account by the court and is left to executive clemency.
23 Aug 1996
The Court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal: the summing-up, read as a whole, was adequate and any omissions were not prejudicial; the trial directions preserved the burden and standard of proof; no evidence of prejudicial jury irregularity from overnight deliberations; the evidence supported the convictions; and there was no basis to disturb the six year sentence imposed on D1.
6 Feb 1991
The applicant's sentence of 7 years is not manifestly excessive because the appropriate starting point for the offences was 18 years given the scale and his role as initiator and his antecedents; he did not qualify for the full supergrass two‑thirds reduction, and the combined discounts for guilty plea and assistance reducing 18 years to 7 years were proper in the circumstances.