8 Apr 2026
The judge's summing‑up was fair, comprehensive and legally correct on the key issues (possession, knowledge, burden and the caution to be applied to PW1); no misdirection or unfair imbalance occurred that could have caused a miscarriage of justice, and the conviction stands as the jury could properly convict on the evidence if they accepted PW1.
12 Jul 2024
On the whole of the evidence the only reasonable inference is that the appellant knew the rear tanks contained light fuel (petrol): his extensive cross‑border driving experience, his act of opening and smelling the tank on return, the implausibility of his explanation, and his failure to make simple inquiries or take reasonable steps establish knowledge beyond reasonable doubt, so the conviction is safe.
8 Aug 2023
The judge's general directions on standard of proof and on inferential reasoning were sufficient in the circumstances; the WhatsApp messages were one piece of circumstantial evidence whose proper weight was for the jury to assess, and neither a special post‑offence two‑pronged direction nor a lies direction was necessary; accordingly there was no substantial risk of miscarriage of justice and the conviction stands.
24 Aug 2017
The conviction was unsafe because the trial judge permitted and recounted hearsay statements of a non‑defendant and failed to give a clear limiting direction that the jury must not use those out‑of‑court statements as proof of the facts asserted (that the parcel belonged to the applicant and thus supported knowledge of drugs); that material misdirection warranted quashing the conviction and ordering a retrial.
19 May 2016
The Court treated the earlier abandonment as a nullity due to the applicant's misunderstanding and language/translation concerns but refused leave to appeal because the judge's summing-up was fair, the directions on burden and standard of proof were correct, and the circumstantial evidence (false name/document, receipt and possession of a parcel containing a large quantity of cocaine at an address where the applicant did not reside) gave the jury a proper case to resolve; therefore the conviction was not shown to be unsafe.
22 May 2015
The court held that there is no legal requirement to give a special direction in the terms contended for; the judge's repeated standard directions as to burden and proof beyond reasonable doubt were sufficient in the circumstances because the prosecution relied on undermining the applicant's credibility rather than establishing an essential fact solely by circumstantial inference, and therefore leave to appeal against conviction was refused.
31 Mar 2015
The Court held that no voir dire was required because the differences between the oral response and the post‑record were matters of credibility and natural meaning for the jury to resolve; the judge's directions sufficiently warned the jury about treating the statement as a confession and met the Mushtaq requirement when read in context; the alleged omission to recall a specific cross‑examination passage did not cause prejudice and the conviction was not unsafe.
17 Sept 2014
The judge erred by applying the wrong test and by assessing evidence and credibility at the discharge stage; on the evidence disclosed (false identity, untrue statements, different signature, avoidance of CCTV, instruction and reward to deliver, and high value of cocaine) a prima facie case of knowledge was established and the discharge was quashed; a trial was ordered and a warrant for arrest issued.
9 Jan 2013
Where evidence showed the applicant was suspicious and avoided inspecting the suitcase, a shut‑eye direction was correctly given and properly qualified; the judge made clear the prosecution still had to prove guilty knowledge beyond reasonable doubt; sentencing followed applicable guidelines for 640g heroin with one year uplift for cross‑border aggravation, so neither conviction nor sentence could be disturbed.
23 Jun 2009
Leave to appeal out of time was refused because the alleged omissions and directions did not amount to an arguable departure from legal norms: the jury had been sufficiently and properly directed, a lies direction was unnecessary and potentially confusing, the standard direction's effect was achieved in the summing up, and drawing inference from the drugs' value and common‑sense questions were permissible; no substantial and grave injustice shown.