5 Sept 2019
There is no factual nexus connecting D1 and D3 in the prosecution's case beyond the common witness PW1; the evidence shows D1 and D3 acted separately and did not know each other in the relevant period, so joinder was improper and, in any event, severance was required to prevent prejudicial evidence from unfairly influencing each defendant's trial.
19 Nov 2014
The court refused the 1st plaintiff's application to rereamend because the proposed amendments were extremely late, introduced fundamentally different allegations that would cause prejudice to the defendants not compensable by costs (loss of documents, faded memory, expanded factual inquiries), and would unfairly change the character of the case. The court granted defendants' applications for further security for costs because the 1st plaintiff is in liquidation, its backers were unwilling to fund the litigation, and further security was necessary to protect defendants from irrecoverable cost…
15 Aug 2014
The court held that there was inordinate and inexcusable delay by reason of a ten-year failure to advance the third party proceedings, that the delay caused prejudice (loss of documents, fading memories, difficulty in adducing evidence) creating a substantial risk of an unfair trial, and that the defendant could not be insulated from the Official Receiver's conduct after bankruptcy because causes of action vested in the trustee; accordingly the third party claim must be struck out and the third party action dismissed.
15 May 2012
Although the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, the court found no sufficient abuse of process nor sufficient prejudice rendering a fair trial impossible; defendants also contributed to delay and did not attempt earlier to discharge the Mareva injunction; accordingly it was not just to strike out and the Mareva injunction should continue.
8 Dec 2010
Leave to file the five draft affirmations was properly refused because the proposed affirmations contained substantial material beyond what could be regarded as reply to the defendant's affirmation, the plaintiff failed to explain why the evidence had not been put forward earlier, and large parts of the material were irrelevant to the prejudice issue.
18 Sept 2009
The court found the plaintiffs were not guilty of inordinate or inexcusable delay; the steps taken to obtain witness evidence justified the period of activity; any prejudice to the 1st defendant was not shown to be such as to make a fair trial impossible; limitation and non‑compliance arguments did not warrant striking out on the material before the court; accordingly the summons to strike out for want of prosecution was dismissed and costs were to follow the event with an order nisi in favour of the plaintiffs for the application costs.
22 Apr 2009
Appeal allowed and Master’s strike out set aside because uncontradicted evidence that plaintiffs lacked funds and now intend to proceed displaced the inference of an intention not to prosecute; delay alone, without demonstrated prejudice to a fair trial, does not satisfy the threshold for abuse of process under Grovit v Doctor and therefore strike out was unjustified.
22 Apr 2009
Although there was inordinate delay of about seven years, the defendants failed to prove prejudice preventing a fair trial and provided no evidence to contradict the plaintiffs' unchallenged explanation that lack of funds caused the delay and that they now intend to proceed; the Master therefore erred in drawing an inference of abuse of process. The appeal is allowed and the strike out is dismissed.
12 Mar 2009
Court found there was inordinate and inexcusable delay by the Plaintiff from March 2005 to January 2008 but the Defendant failed to establish sufficient prejudice or conduct amounting to abuse of process that would justify dismissal; the limitation period had not expired and this weighed heavily against striking out; exercise of discretion was to refuse dismissal and to dismiss the Re-Amended Summons (the Defendant's striking out application).
10 Mar 2009
The Court allowed the defendants' appeal and dismissed the action for want of prosecution because the plaintiff had prosecuted the action in a half‑hearted and dilatory manner, there was inordinate and inexcusable delay and that delay had caused severe prejudice (loss of witnesses and evidence) such that a fair trial was no longer possible; the judge below erred in concluding no prejudice existed.