15 Nov 2024
The application for leave was dismissed because the applicant did not identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds and the complaint was essentially a private/customer-service matter not amenable to judicial review.
23 Jul 2008
Applying the real‑possibility test, the court held there was no real possibility of bias because Lai was unlikely to be called (or would be a witness of last resort), the defence had no information about the likely substance of Lai's evidence, and any testimony was uncertain so that a reasonable, fair‑minded observer would not conclude there was a real possibility of judicial bias; therefore the trial judge correctly refused to recuse himself and the judicial review was dismissed.
30 Nov 2004
On true construction of the Ordinance the chairman of a disciplinary committee may appoint a replacement member who has died or for bona fide reason stood down so long as the appointment does not prejudice a fair and impartial hearing; in the present case no unfairness was shown and the judicial review application is dismissed.
16 Jan 2003
The 28 February memo evidenced that the Force Discipline Officer had effectively made up his mind to terminate the applicant before the statutorily required show-cause opportunity, thereby breaching procedural fairness under reg 14(6)(a); the proper remedy was to quash the FDO's decision by certiorari and to order mandamus reinstating the applicant, but an order of prohibition preventing re-determination was inappropriate because it would frustrate mandatory disciplinary procedures and was not warranted on the facts.
6 Feb 2001
Application dismissed because it was out of time under Order 53 rule 4(1) and, substantively, judicial review was an inappropriate remedy to restrain statutory recovery proceedings under s.75 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance where the District Court is a court of competent jurisdiction and the taxpayer retains statutory internal objection and appeal remedies; the Commissioner’s undertaking to consider objections did not render judicial review appropriate.
28 Jun 2000
Leave to apply for judicial review was refused because the application was premature and not an appropriate use of judicial review: the magistrate's ruling was an intermediate step in ongoing committal proceedings, adequate alternative remedies remained (trial judge determination, committal, indictment stage and appeal), the circumstances were not exceptional, and the High Court could not finally dispose of the dispute given outstanding factual issues under s.19 of the Trade Descriptions Ordinance; therefore discretion to grant leave was declined and costs awarded to the respondent.
6 Jun 1994
Section 11E(2)(d) of Cap.327, which provided that the Director or his representative shall be a member (and capable of being chairman) of the Disciplinary Board, is inconsistent with s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights because the Director is the accuser and his presence (or that of his representative) on the tribunal gives rise to a real possibility of bias; that provision is therefore deemed repealed from 6 June 1991 and the Disciplinary Board decision of 28 September 1993 was quashed as made by an invalidly constituted tribunal. The method of appointing panel members under s.8A was not con…
2 Apr 1992
The application for judicial review was misconceived for an interlocutory attack on ongoing criminal proceedings; the appropriate route is to raise the complaints before the trial court and, if necessary, on appeal; absent exceptional justiciable circumstances the High Court should not grant prohibition or stay against a District Judge in these facts, and the motion is dismissed.
23 Dec 1988
The Court held that although some administrative ex parte contacts occurred they were innocuous and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; therefore prohibition was refused. However the Committee of Inquiry had no jurisdiction to make the Order Nisi for costs dated 12 July 1988, and that order was quashed by certiorari.
23 Nov 1988
The adjudicating officer's personal visit and acceptance of oral out-of-court evidence without affording the Applicant an opportunity to meet that evidence constituted a breach of natural justice. That defect could not appropriately be remedied by directing the Commissioner to cure the defect in the future under Rule 225H because the correct remedy in the circumstances is to quash the entire disciplinary findings and require the matter to be reheard de novo; remittal under the rule risked depriving the Applicant of appeal rights and treating him as bearing the burden of displacing an unfair d…