Hong Kong Case Law: Decisions & Judgments

Topic

Right to land

Legal area

Court

30 Jul 2025

STEWART MARCUS JONATHAN v. SECRETARY FOR SECURITY AND ANOTHER

Citation

[2025] HKCFI 1673
Court

Court of First Instance
Case number

HCAL256/2022

The court held that a former HKPR who holds the statutory right to land under s2AAA IO is a person who, at the time of consideration of a deportation order, has the right to enter and remain in Hong Kong for the purposes of section 11 BORO; accordingly BOR 19 was engaged and the Secretary/Director were required to take the Applicant's family rights into account by applying a proportionality assessment. Applying that test to the facts, the court found the Decision proportionate and lawful and therefore dismissed the substantive judicial review and upheld the Deportation Order.
7 Feb 2025

STEWART MARCUS JONATHAN v. SECRETARY FOR SECURITY AND ANOTHER

Citation

[2025] HKCFI 595
Court

Court of First Instance
Case number

HCAL256/2022

Leave to apply for judicial review granted solely on the arguable point that the interaction of s11 of the BORO, BOR 19 and s2AAA of the Immigration Ordinance may require a proportionality assessment of interference with family life when considering a deportation order; all other grounds were not reasonably arguable and are refused.
10 Oct 2022

NASEEM-AKHTAR (Next to kin of MUHAMMAD RIZWAN) v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

Citation

[2022] HKCFI 3104
Court

Court of First Instance
Case number

HCAL989/2022

Leave to apply for judicial review was refused because the initiating documents failed to identify any public law grounds and did not seek or justify an extension of time for proceedings that were plainly out of time; those deficiencies were fatal to the application.
3 Sept 2003

COMMISSIONER OF REGISTRATION v. REGISTRATION OF PERSONS TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER

Citation

COMMISSIONER OF REGISTRATION v. REGISTRATION OF PERSONS TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER
Court

Court of First Instance
Case number

HCAL176/2002

The Tribunal's decision was legally erroneous because the statutory concept of a right to land did not exist under pre‑1972 law and Mr Wong therefore had no right to land when he returned in 1992; he entered and remained by permission subject to limits and became an overstayer, so his post‑1992 residence could not be counted towards the seven years required for permanent residency; the Tribunal's decision is quashed and the matter remitted for reconsideration in accordance with this legal analysis.
10 Dec 2001

THE REGISTRAR OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS v. SYED HAIDER YAHYA HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER

Citation

THE REGISTRAR OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS v. SYED HAIDER YAHYA HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER
Court

Court of Final Appeal
Case number

FACV6/2001

The 1936 Deportation Ordinance did not confer a right or immunity from immigration control; it only conferred a limited power of deportation which did not apply to persons who, like the father, fell outside its scope; the father was lawfully subject to immigration control after policy and statutory changes (from 1969 and under the Immigration Ordinance 1971) and therefore was not "settled" at the dates of the births; the Registrar's refusal to correct the Register and birth certificates was lawful.
26 Mar 1987

DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION v. NG SHUN LOI

Citation

DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION v. NG SHUN LOI
Court

Court of Appeal
Case number

CACV2/1987

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the Immigration Tribunal's determination because applying the objective test for 'ordinary residence' (as explained in R v Barnet) the evidence established the respondent's habitual and ordinary place of living during 1963–1986 was Mainland China, not Hong Kong; intention to return and enforced absence did not convert that factual residence into ordinary residence in Hong Kong, and no reasonable judicial tribunal could have reached the contrary conclusion on the evidence (Edwards v Bairstow).
25 Feb 1987

RE WONG LEUNG FOO

Citation

RE WONG LEUNG FOO
Court

Court of First Instance
Case number

HCMP209/1987

The applicant did not satisfy the statutory definition of a Chinese resident (no continuous seven years ordinary residence) and produced no evidence of an express statutory or legal right to remain arising from pre-1972 practice; administrative policy cannot create or preserve an accrued right contrary to the clear provisions of the Immigration Ordinance, and under s.64 the applicant bore the onus of proving any exemption — accordingly the removal order was lawful and the application dismissed.
24 Feb 1987

CHOY SIU HUNG ALIAS TSOI SIU HUNG v. ATTORNEY GENERAL THE IMMIGRATION TRIBUNAL

Citation

CHOY SIU HUNG ALIAS TSOI SIU HUNG v. ATTORNEY GENERAL THE IMMIGRATION TRIBUNAL
Court

Court of First Instance
Case number

HCMP79/1987

Applicant was an illegal entrant with no right to land under s8(1); no legitimate expectation arose from prior renewals; the Director and Tribunal afforded the applicant a hearing and appeal; the applicant failed to show the Director's exercise of discretion was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it (Wednesbury standard); judicial review dismissed.
21 Oct 1986

CHEUNG CHEONG v. ATTORNEY GENERAL

Citation

CHEUNG CHEONG v. ATTORNEY GENERAL
Court

Court of Appeal
Case number

CACV122/1986

The Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney General's appeal, holding that the tribunal was entitled to find that the immigrant had not established continuous ordinary residence for seven years because his prolonged post‑release residence in his native village evidenced a settled intention not to return; therefore the period of imprisonment did not preserve continuity of ordinary residence and the removal order was lawful.
29 May 1986

CHEUNG CHEONG v. ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ANOTHER

Citation

CHEUNG CHEONG v. ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ANOTHER
Court

Court of First Instance
Case number

HCMP872/1986

The Court concluded that on the facts before the Tribunal the only proper conclusion was that the applicant was ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for a period of not less than seven years (imprisonment abroad did not break the continuity of ordinary residence in the circumstances) and therefore quashed the Tribunal's decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration; however the Court refused to grant a standalone declaration because s.53D renders the Tribunal's decision final and it would be inappropriate to make a declaration conflicting with a tribunal's statutory final decision.