22 Apr 2025
Appellate court found prosecution evidence of posting and delivery of P4 credible, rejected appellant's denial as not credible, concluded elements of the offence under the Fire Services Regulation were proven beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore dismissed the appeal and affirmed conviction and the HK$8,000 fine.
5 May 2023
Leave was granted because on the low prima facie threshold the applicant had demonstrated an arguable defence and it was in the interests of the separate legal entity Modena HK to permit intervention where the controlling shareholder was the plaintiff; the company’s failure to defend was attributable to the conflict/control issues and misconduct, the statutory notice requirement could be dispensed with, and the applicant undertook to bear initial costs and indemnify Modena HK for any adverse costs orders.
5 May 2023
Leave was granted because on the face of the application the proposed derivative defence was prima facie arguable and it was in the interests of Modena HK to have the claimant-related majority removed from control of the company’s defence; the statutory notice requirement was satisfied or properly dispensed with; and the applicant undertook to bear initial costs and indemnify Modena HK for any adverse costs order, making grant appropriate despite contested factual issues which are unsuitable for resolution at this interlocutory stage.
21 Apr 2022
The certificate of posting (P4) under RTO s76 established a conclusive presumption that the notice was duly served at the registered address; the prosecution proved service and all elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt; the trial judge did not err and the conviction is upheld.
29 Oct 1996
The appeals were dismissed because the appellant failed to put forward factual material capable of displacing the prima facie statutory presumption created by s33(8) of the Buildings Ordinance and therefore failed to show a meritorious defence to justify setting aside the default judgment.
17 Apr 1982
The court held the exercised option was, at least arguable, to create a new renewed two-year tenancy commencing after the expired three-year term rather than an extension of the original term; consequently exemption under Part V was not plainly established and triable issues existed about the requirement for and service of a six-month statutory notice, so the defendant must be let in to defend and the Master's order was set aside.