20 Feb 2019
The court held that s 3(2) of the Adoption Act, as then read, differentiated against persons whose marriages had been dissolved and that such differentiation could not be justified on the statutory and social evidence, but it was reasonably possible and consistent with the Act's purpose to interpret "spouses" in s 3(2) to include former spouses so as to permit joint adoption applications by former spouses.
2 Mar 1999
The court held that in s145(3) of the 1992 Act "remarriage" bears its ordinary meaning as a legal marriage solemnised under the Marriage Act 1955 and does not include the entering into a de facto relationship; therefore a de facto relationship does not trigger cancellation of weekly compensation under s145(3). The Review Officer's and Corporation's decisions cancelling entitlement were revoked.
15 Sept 1998
A relationship in the nature of marriage (a de facto relationship) constitutes 'remarriage' within the meaning of s145(3) of the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992; accordingly weekly compensation properly ceased two years after the commencement of the de facto relationship and the respondent's decision is correct.
1 May 1998
Because the appellant and the deceased were living apart at the time of death and the deceased was not financially contributing to the appellant's welfare, and the separation was not principally due to health, imprisonment, or employment, the appellant did not satisfy the statutory definition of 'spouse' in section 3 and the appeal is dismissed.
18 Dec 1997
On the balance of probabilities the appellant proved the deceased was contributing financially to her welfare by regular cash payments toward half the mortgage and contributions to child care and household costs; such contributions satisfy s3 and entitle her to the survivor's grant under s56 and weekly compensation under s58, so the Review Officer's declinature is revoked.
13 Jun 1997
Reading s.145(3) in the context of the Act and its s.3 definition of 'spouse' the court concluded that 'remarriage' includes entering into a relationship in the nature of marriage; therefore cessation of weekly compensation two years after such a relationship commenced was lawful and the appeal was dismissed.
7 Jun 1996
The parties were living apart at the time of the deceased's death and the review officer was entitled to find there was no proven financial contribution by the deceased to the appellant; therefore under the statutory definition of 'spouse' the appellant was excluded and not entitled to the survivor's grant.
10 May 1996
Appellant failed to discharge the onus on the balance of probabilities that she and the deceased were not "living apart"; the undisputed facts that she received a Domestic Purposes Benefit and the deceased made no financial contributions, together with the tenuous and recent evidence of a possible reconciliation, establish that the parties were living apart and therefore the appellant was not a spouse under s.3 of the Act.
23 Aug 1995
Section 3 explicitly requires the spouse to be 'of the opposite sex'; because the appellant was a same-sex partner she does not fall within the statutory definition and the court must apply the clear wording of the Act, therefore the appeal is dismissed.