26 May 2016
On the evidence the appellant's depressive disorder was longstanding and episodic with continuous or partial remission managed by medication; the accepted treatment injury contributed to exacerbations but did not cause a new clinically significant mental disorder as required by s26(1)(c); therefore the appellant is not entitled to cover and the appeal is dismissed.
30 Oct 2015
On the balance of probabilities the evidence taken as a whole showed the appellant's post concussion syndrome symptoms persisted and continued to affect her capacity at the time ACC suspended entitlements; ACC failed to demonstrate a sufficient evidential basis to be 'not satisfied' under s117(1) that entitlement should be suspended, so the suspension was unjustified and must be quashed and entitlements reinstated.
19 Sept 2001
The correct test in ACC claims is statutory causation, not importing tort notions such as the eggshell skull; on the facts and on medical evidence the 1996 aircraft incident materially re‑exacerbated a previously recovered 1970 injury and therefore the appellant's current condition is causally linked to the 1996 accident; accordingly the Corporation's refusal to fund further surgery was quashed.
7 Aug 2001
On the balance of expert psychiatric and medical evidence the judge found the appellant's chronic pain disorder was precipitated by the 1986 back injury and thus constituted a mental consequence of the compensable personal injury; pre-existing vulnerability did not negate coverage (eggshell skull principle applies) and ACC's decision to cease entitlements was therefore unlawful and must be revoked.
12 Jan 2001
The appellant failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that his current mental injury was caused by the 1991 physical injury; psychiatric evidence established a complex, multifactorial somatoform/psychosomatic disorder driven largely by non-injury factors (marital problems, anxiety, depression and personality), so the insurer correctly declined ongoing entitlements and the appeal is dismissed.
20 Dec 2000
Experts agreed the 1 June 1996 head injury while in the appellant's employ precipitated the claimant's ongoing incapacity even if pre-existing minor injuries made him more susceptible; the statutory definition of "qualifying claim" was satisfied; regulation 5C(4)(b) and related provisions do not import a discretion to exclude the payments for the 1998/1999 assessment; consequently the payments are qualifying payments attributable to the appellant for experience rating and the respondent's attribution was lawful.
16 Aug 2000
On the balance of probabilities the appellant's Telecom employment tasks and environment (high-volume alpha keyboarding at speed, increased workload, workstation setup including mouse position causing altered posture) caused or contributed to his tendonitis/OOS and the risk of such injury is significantly greater for persons performing those tasks in that environment; therefore the three s.7(1) criteria are satisfied and appellant is entitled to cover; respondent's cross-appeal on s.7(1)(a) refused.
12 Aug 1999
The Review Officer's finding that there was evidence linking the employee's injury to a specific accident in the course of employment was reasonable and, on that basis and the specialist medical opinion, the onus shifted to the appellant; the Court will uphold the classification as a work injury absent successful challenge at a resumed hearing, and therefore confirms the respondent's decision of 2 March 1998 subject to the reserved procedure.
29 Jun 1999
On the total medical evidence the respondent's ongoing symptoms are substantially caused by pre-existing degenerative changes in the lumbar spine; there is insufficient medical support that the accidents themselves caused the degenerative condition or are the predominant cause of ongoing incapacity, therefore s10 excludes cover and the appellant's decision to cease entitlements was correct; the procedural irregularity did not necessitate rehearing because the substantive appeal succeeds.
28 May 1999
The Court concluded the medical records demonstrated longstanding similar symptoms predating the May 1993 accident and the medical evidence did not establish that the accident caused the incapacity that led to discharge; the appellant failed to discharge the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities, so weekly compensation was not payable.