26 Oct 2023
The judge dismissed the application for leave to cross-examine because the application could be dealt with on the papers and cross-examination was not necessary at this interim procedural stage; detailed reasons were reserved and to be issued with the substantive judgment on the discovery application.
30 Nov 2022
Leave to cross-examine the deponent Ms Dayle McKibbon was granted because the Prison Director, who made the challenged decisions, was incapacitated and unavailable to provide evidence, making the deponent's recommendations and reasons central to testing the lawfulness and reasonableness of the segregation orders; cross-examination was limited, tightly focused on identified factual disputes linked to pleaded grounds, and subject to strict time and case-management directions.
4 Oct 2021
Leave to cross-examine H was refused because the court found, on the substance of the evidence, a clear mutuality of interest and evidence of communication between H and the respondent's agent indicating alignment; however, the respondent was permitted to ask questions of H of the type used when leading one's own witness provided they are not leading, with the judge to intervene if questions become leading.
30 Nov 2017
Leave to cross-examine Mr Liggett was refused because his evidence did not prove any disputed material fact central to whether the IHP acted unfairly, the relevant matters could be determined from the public record and the decision-maker's affidavit, Mr Liggett was not the decision-maker, and permitting cross-examination would needlessly prolong the proceedings contrary to the thresholds in Evidence Act ss 7 and 8.
25 Nov 2016
The evidence that the complainant had consensual sex with a friend shortly after the alleged rape or months earlier in the car was not directly relevant to the issue of consent or the appellant's reasonable belief in consent and therefore would not have met the heightened relevance threshold in s 44(3); leave would not have been granted and no miscarriage of justice occurred, so the appeal is dismissed.
29 Aug 2016
Indemnity costs were not ordered because the applicant's conduct did not meet the threshold of flagrant, vexatious or improper behaviour required by r 14.6(4); increased costs were not justified generally, but an uplift for the preparation of the opposition to the arrest warrant and contempt application was appropriate (Band C for that step versus Band B otherwise), resulting in a costs award to respondents of $5,798 plus disbursements to be fixed by the Registrar.
2 Jul 2015
Leave to cross-examine was refused because the deponent's affidavit and voluminous exhibits adequately explained the decision-making process, the evidential record was sufficient for the Court to determine the judicial review grounds, cross-examination would risk a fishing expedition and unwarranted merits review, and the interests of justice did not require departing from the presumption against cross-examination.
9 Apr 2014
Section 4 of the Māori Language Act 1987 gives counsel appearing before the Waitangi Tribunal the right to speak te reo Māori whether or not witnesses understand it; however the Tribunal may lawfully regulate the exercise of that right by imposing reasonable procedural conditions (including requiring notice, managing interpreter availability and controlling hearing time) consistent with its powers to manage inquiry proceedings. Although it was not open to the presiding officer to require questions be asked in English as a matter of law, the court declined to grant relief setting aside the rul…
25 Mar 2013
Cross-examination of the third respondent was refused because judicial review is normally determined on affidavits, nothing in the applicant's material showed the third respondent caused the alleged procedural unfairness, and therefore cross-examination would serve no useful purpose; instead the Court directed case management steps including a joint memorandum and a timetabling conference.
18 Feb 2013
The court allowed the amendment because the proposed Wednesbury unreasonableness ground could have been pleaded earlier in light of Toogood J's decision, the amendment would not require further evidence or cause undue prejudice or delay to the first respondent, and allowing it better served the interests of justice.