2 Jul 2020
Leave to extend time to appeal was refused because the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for a substantial 15–18 month delay, the delay caused real prejudice to the respondent who had relied on the Family Court order in arranging his finances, and the proposed appeal did not demonstrate sufficiently strong merits to overcome the delay and prejudice.
19 Jun 2020
The court accepted defendants' approach that the Primary Sum interest should be assessed by reference to the BNZ term deposit rates as the plaintiffs' real opportunity cost, compounded annually with rates specified for each year and calculated from 1 February 2015; the Secondary Sum (repayments kept by defendants) attracts simple interest at the maximum prescribed rate of 5% from 1 February 2015 on outstanding balances; post-judgment payments are to be applied first to interest, then principal (Primary Sum and general damages), and then to costs; costs awarded to plaintiffs totalled $45,607.7…
20 May 2020
Although the threshold of impecuniosity was satisfied, the court declined to order security for costs because the plaintiff is legally aided (s 45 makes costs awards against legally aided parties exceptional) and the application was for summary judgment where costs awards are unlikely; balancing access to justice against the defendant's interests and the low prospect of a costs award led to refusal of security at this stage.
3 Feb 2020
The court exercised its discretion under s91 to keep the entire proceeding in the District Court: the issues are within District Court competence, the claims and counterclaims are closely linked but competing considerations (substantial delay and prejudice to the plaintiff if transferred, likely earlier hearing in District Court, proportionality and complexity if linked to Auckland High Court proceeding) outweighed reasons for transfer, so the application to transfer was refused and the matter remains in the Whangarei District Court.
23 Apr 2018
The respondent was awarded costs on a 2B scale limited to recoverable counsel appearances; the court calculated scale costs at $9,812 but reduced that amount by 20% to reflect the plaintiff's contribution to delay and additional cost, and allowed recovery of filing fees; unrepresented periods were not recoverable.
4 Oct 2016
The Court granted leave to adduce fresh evidence from Dr Rosic, held that the High Court's framing (imposing an onus and requiring 'compelling/exceptional' reasons) was incorrect, clarified that suppression in civil cases is a discretionary balancing exercise without a fixed exceptional threshold, and applied that balance to allow suppression in respect of proposed witness CW (given credible psychiatric evidence of PTSD and risk of intimidation) while dismissing suppression for the other proposed witnesses on the record before the High Court; the Court also set aside the High Court costs orde…
21 Apr 2016
The extension of time was declined because, notwithstanding the short delay caused by counsel error, the proposed appeal was hopeless: the High Court's extensive credibility and factual findings were unimpeachable on appeal, discretionary factors weighed against granting the indulgence and no public importance justified extension; no costs order was made due to interim legal aid.
8 Apr 2016
Costs awarded to respondents on a 1A basis rather than 2B because the matters were straightforward and required minimal time; no exceptional circumstances justified awarding costs despite the appellant's prior legal aid, and costs were limited to steps after 23 July 2015 when legal aid ceased.
14 Jul 2015
Leave to appeal was refused because the issues did not raise questions of law or fact warranting further appellate consideration under s 67; the appellant was not the substantially successful party (limited success owed to respondent and independent accountant), and the exercise of discretion to leave costs and disbursements to lie where they fall was appropriate.
10 Nov 2014
The caveat was properly dismissed because the interest claimed was limited to surplus proceeds of sale and not a proprietary interest in the land; even if a caveatable interest could be pleaded, the Court properly exercised its discretion to allow the caveat to lapse because there was no practical advantage in maintaining it given the appellants could not repurchase the property; summary judgment for possession was correct because the appellants had no binding contractual or trust entitlement to possession; however the High Court costs awards were quashed because the appellants were not given…