30 Oct 2023
Taking into account the time records, the write-down from $18,036 to $15,000, and the legitimate need for non-party solicitors to 'get up to speed', the $15,000 fee was within a reasonable range and therefore payable by the Lomax parties to Mr Townsend.
21 Feb 2020
Plaintiffs were awarded costs on a 2B basis because they succeeded in proving Vey's affairs were conducted oppressively; the court refused to make Mr Fugle solely liable because sole personal benefit or impropriety was not established, and instead ordered costs against both defendants jointly and severally; the court declined to reserve costs pending valuation because defendants' failures (including not preparing accounts) prevented plaintiffs from assessing earlier offers.
28 Jun 2019
Because the Supreme Court reversed the earlier substantive positions and declared the appellants to be the successful party on the substantive issues, the general principle that costs follow the event applies. No persuasive reason was shown to depart from that principle; accordingly the first respondents must pay the appellants' costs of this appeal as specified.
2 Apr 2019
The settlement produced the substantive result sought by the plaintiffs (realisation of the value of their shares), so plaintiffs were the successful party entitled to 2B costs; claimed disbursements including the expert accountant's fees were specific, necessary and reasonable and were approved; defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs and disbursements totalling $53,944.32 and interest from the date of judgment; the Court declined to make personal liability or indemnity orders against the directors under s174 or otherwise.
23 Aug 2018
Adjournment refused and leave to pursue further discovery and to amend the counterclaim denied because both parties failed to act when circumstances changed, the defendant did not timely press discovery concerns, the discrete deadlock/arbitration issue can be determined within the five‑day hearing on 3 September 2018, and allowing late amendment or further discovery would jeopardise the fixture; accordingly the trial proceeds with directions to limit preparation to the deadlock/arbitration issue.
16 Sept 2013
The application to vary the injunction was declined because the company currently has sufficient funds on term deposits to meet short to medium term silviculture obligations, the proposed $1.5m long-term investment is unnecessary at this interlocutory stage and would be inconsistent with the purpose of the interim injunction (preserving assets and control pending trial), and the proposed control/signatory arrangements risk prejudicing the plaintiffs' position under s 174(2).
18 Dec 2012
Court found plaintiffs have a good arguable s174 case, Totara's assets were at risk and interim control was required, but appointment of interim liquidators was unnecessary; instead the Court granted tailored interim injunctions restraining dividends, loans/advances/drawings, hiring, large salaries, real property purchases and disposals while permitting completion of a specified Oakura purchase and reserving leave to vary the injunctions.
1 Apr 2009
Section 4(1)(d) of the Limitation Act 1950 does not apply to s174 Companies Act 1993 claims because s174 creates a general discretionary equitable remedy extending beyond actions to recover sums recoverable by virtue of an enactment; additionally, even if s4(1)(d) could apply, leave to amend was refused on discretionary grounds because of delay, proximity of trial and prejudice to the plaintiff requiring re-focussed valuation evidence.
25 Oct 2006
Payment of fair value determined by an expert under a Tomlin Order does not necessarily preclude a subsequent s174 claim for compensation where the valuation was a forward‑looking capitalisation of maintainable earnings and did not purport to include compensation for past oppressive conduct; therefore the strike‑out application failed and the Associate Judge's refusal to strike out is upheld.