New Zealand Case Law: Decisions & Judgments

Topic

Set aside default judgment

Legal area

Court

22 Feb 2021

GLENVAR VAULT CAPITAL LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) v FOSTER CRESCENT LIMITED [2021] NZHC 139

Citation

[2021] NZHC 139
Court

High Court

Default judgment was varied because allowing it to stand would be a miscarriage of justice; on the evidence Foster Crescent paid $659,591.56 to complete the purchase which discharged Glenvar's position in an asset valued at $711,000, producing an undervalue recoverable under s297 of $51,508.44; the buy-back option, although enforceable, was executory and did not constitute value received by Glenvar for s297 calculation; Foster Crescent failed to establish the s296(3) defence because a reasonable person in its position would have had reasonable grounds to suspect Glenvar's insolvency.
23 Jul 2018

LAGEDER v CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL [2018] NZHC 1824

Citation

[2018] NZHC 1824
Court

High Court

Default judgment was properly entered and should not be set aside because the appellant had authorised (expressly or impliedly) Fox and Associates to submit the resource consent and engage with Council, or had clothed them with ostensible authority, and the appellant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for not filing a defence within the required time.
26 May 2015

GRINDLAY v MEMELINK [2015] NZHC 1135

Citation

[2015] NZHC 1135
Court

High Court

The appellants failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to file a defence or adequate admissible evidence of payment to establish an arguable defence; consequently the default judgment should largely remain in place, except that the defence point that Mrs Grindlay was not a signatory to the lease was at least arguable and warranted setting aside the judgment against her; the District Court's conditional regime was appropriate but the compliance period was shortened to 14 days.
19 Mar 2013

DONALDSON V FRANKTON ALUMINIUM (1982) LIMITED HC HAM CIV 2012-419-001478

Citation

openlaw-2ebc2e8c_3af1_40f4_84fc_f74ad7b4011e.pdf
Court

High Court

Because a compliant Form 3 response had been validly served on the plaintiff before the plaintiff applied for default judgment, r 2.39 and the prescribed Form 6A preclude a plaintiff from obtaining default judgment after receipt of a response; the judgment was therefore irregularly obtained and must be set aside under r 12.34 to avoid a potential miscarriage of justice.
22 Nov 2012

PIONEER FARMS LIMITED V HAMISH ALEX STODDART AND LYNETTE ANNE RITCHIE HC PMN CIV-2012-454-469

Citation

openlaw-1fb490f7_f506_473a_aa3b_51a2b0e50fa8.pdf
Court

High Court

The High Court dismissed the appeal because the District Court did not err: the respondents had an arguable/substantial defence linked to alleged misrepresentations (supporting set-off), their delay was reasonably explained by attempts to resolve the dispute and early letters placed the appellant on notice, and the appellant would not suffer irreparable prejudice; accordingly there was a real risk of miscarriage of justice if the default judgment were enforced without hearing the defence.
26 Oct 2012

CHANG-HOOKER V ROOKE HC AK CIV-2011-404-6074

Citation

openlaw-6c4383d1_6d6f_4914_93d9_19e2effcd054.pdf
Court

High Court

The stay application was dismissed because most impugned District Court decisions were not the subject of any pending appeal (and leave to appeal out of time had been refused), the High Court lacks jurisdiction to stay execution of District Court judgments where no appeal or review is pending, and the sole extant appeal had no realistic prospect of success given reliance on overturning earlier decisions already dismissed.
30 Mar 2012

WILLIAMS AND WILLIAMS V VAN LOGHEM INVESTMENTS LTD HC AK CIV-2008-404-5241

Citation

openlaw-807ba59f_60d5_4466_b733_1abae5cf9a0f.pdf
Court

High Court

Judgment was regularly obtained and applicant had clear repeated notice and opportunities to participate; his delay was unexplained and he elected a deliberate course not to defend (courting risk); although he had arguable grounds that apportionment would differ, those grounds did not outweigh the substantial prejudice to respondent and others arising from finality of the settlement; therefore no miscarriage of justice and the application to set aside is dismissed, but the court varied the interest component reducing the judgment total.
20 Jul 2009

RD1 LIMITED V DRYLAND AND DRYLAND TRADING AS JAG FARMS HC HAM CIV 2009-419-000168

Citation

openlaw-bfb02402_b092_4026_9f61_8e75703b1589.pdf
Court

High Court

By consent the Court set aside the default judgment against Andrew Dryland, made a charging order over 25 Belmont Avenue (Certificate of Title SA10C/727), discharged the charging order over 22 Yeats Crescent (Certificate of Title SA8D/402) with cooperation to secure removal from title if needed, reserved leave to apply for relief from the charging order over 25 Belmont, transferred the substantive claim back to the District Court for determination and awarded costs to RD1 Limited on a 2B basis plus enforcement costs of $2,367.50 for the period from mid‑2008.
10 Mar 2008

MEHTA AND MEHTA V GRIMSHAW & CO (FORMERLY CAIRNS SLANE) HC AK CIV-2007-404-004855

Citation

openlaw-1af93a18_c477_492d_b087_8b4dd2c8b49b.pdf
Court

High Court

The High Court held the quantum judgment of 15 May 2007 was irregularly obtained because no rule authorised entry of a quantum judgment at the mention hearing in the manner undertaken (r 486 and r 463 did not apply in the circumstances), the District Court acted without lawful authority and in excess of jurisdiction, and consequently the judgment must be set aside ex debito justitiae; the lower Judge erred by treating the judgment as regularly obtained and applying the wrong legal test.