19 Nov 2019
Applications for extension of time and for a stay were declined because the applicant had not first sought to set aside the High Court consent orders or to obtain a stay in the High Court, jurisdictional limits including s56(3) may bar an interlocutory appeal absent High Court leave, and no special circumstances justified bypassing ordinary procedure.
21 Dec 2017
The consent order was valid and binding; appellants' claims of illness, misunderstanding and procedural defects were rejected as not credible or immaterial; although the contempt finding arose by reason of appellant Ying's actions resulting in breach of the consent order (criminal contempt), any procedural deficiency in warning about self-incrimination did not produce a miscarriage of justice because contempt would have been established without her testimony; the fine imposed was excessive and reduced from NZD 10,000 to NZD 7,500.
7 Nov 2017
The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and certified the question for determination: whether the order setting aside the Part 14 proposal should have been set aside, thereby allowing appellate consideration of the correctness of the interlocutory order.
1 Feb 2012
The appellants pursued largely meritless arguments, attempted to introduce evidence after leave was refused and filed voluminous, duplicative submissions which unreasonably increased the respondent's costs; accordingly a 50% uplift on the appeal costs ($10,720) is justified, while no uplift is warranted for the separate application for leave to appeal (costs $6,580).
3 Jul 2009
The Court declined to enter a new money judgment 'on a judgment' because doing so would alter the character of the existing consent orders and could affect the ability to set them aside; instead the appropriate relief is declaratory: the Court declared the first defendant owes $180,000 under clauses 4(e) and 8 and the second defendant (the trusts) owes $180,000 under clauses 4(e) and 9, leaving any substantive challenges to be pursued by application to set aside or vary the consent orders.
11 Feb 2008
The application to set aside or vary the consent order was dismissed because the plaintiff's inability to borrow was not a significant change or new fact given the plaintiff's known insolvency when consenting, and because rule 60(1)(b) and the exercise of the Court's discretion required security for costs to protect the defendant from unrecoverable costs; the balance favoured maintaining the security order.
12 Sept 2007
The application to set aside the writs was refused because the sealed consent order of 25 November 2003 unambiguously preserved the respondent's entitlement to pursue the amounts in Schedule D; extrinsic memoranda and affidavits could not vary the clear terms of the sealed order; the writs were properly issued and executed and no stay was warranted.