15 Jun 2015
Leave to appeal was granted because it is arguable as a question of law that s18 of the Interpretation Act 1999 preserves the application of the 2003 Regulations to Mr Davis' entitlement once cover was conferred in June 2010, despite the 2010 Regulations coming into force before the claim was finally assessed.
2 May 1997
Section 54(5)-(6) and section 63(4) of the Act fix the commencement of any independence allowance and remove judicial discretion to backdate beyond the prescribed dates; therefore the appellant was not entitled to a backdating to 20 June 1995 and the Review Officer's decision was correct.
21 Apr 1997
The appellant's psychiatric condition, as worsened by the house fire and covered by the Act, rendered him unable to perform the tasks in the Schedule to the Home Help Regulations; therefore he is entitled to home help payments and arrears on that basis and to periodic re-assessment. The Corporation's discretion under s26A does not defeat entitlement where accident-related loss of independence is established.
26 Sept 1996
Section 54(14) of the 1992 Act requires the assessed degree of disability to be reduced by the percentage of permanent impairment on which a prior s78 lump sum was based; applying that rule (reducing 69% by 66.3%) produced a residual 2.7% disability below the 10% threshold, therefore no entitlement to an independence allowance and the respondent's decision was upheld.
18 Apr 1996
The Act permits the date of assessment to be read as the date at which the claimant's degree of disability is assessed (not strictly the physical date the assessment occurred), and because the 1992 Act limits backdating before 1 July 1992, the appellant's degree of disability must be reassessed as at 1 July 1992 (or at a date between 1 July 1992 and 12 October 1994) and, if entitled, the independence allowance must be backdated to that date.
23 Aug 1995
The judge held that, applying s54 of the 1992 Act, entitlement to the independence allowance begins from the date of assessment (16 September 1994) because there was no evidence that the appellant had applied for the allowance or established deterioration prior to 1 July 1992; accordingly the respondent correctly refused to backdate the allowance and the appeal was dismissed.