30 Jun 2023
Leave to appeal was granted because a bona fide question of law arose about the correctness of the Smallfield v Brown test and its resolution could substantially affect the parties' rights; the court confined its determination to the jurisdictional issue and did not decide the substantive appeal.
24 May 2012
Defendant had no real defence because she had agreed in principle in early 2011 to partition and to share costs then unilaterally withdrew; plaintiffs hold a majority two-thirds share; comparative hardship favours plaintiffs; therefore summary judgment was appropriate to grant a bare order for partition while leaving the form of partition, valuation, compensation and cost-sharing to be determined subsequently.
4 Mar 2011
Plaintiffs must pay defendants' costs; defendants are entitled to a 50% uplift on scale costs for steps incurred after the 30 October 2008 Calderbank offer because plaintiffs unreasonably refused a materially better settlement; only a single costs allowance is appropriate for the three owner-defendants due to their community of interest; junior counsel allowance is justified given complexity; quantum of scale costs awarded is $50,520 with disbursements claimed of $22,418.78 to be agreed or fixed by the Registrar.
21 May 2007
The court held that co-owners of cross-leased land remain entitled to the statutory right to partition; cross-lease titles and interlocking leasehold/freehold obligations do not of themselves oust the statutory right absent clear express contracting-out; accordingly the plaintiffs were entitled to an order declaring the court will order partition of the property, subject to the form of partition and the obtaining of requisite resource/subdivision consent, with matters of detailed form and value adjustments reserved for further proceedings.
11 May 2007
The consent was at least arguably an equitable restrictive covenant capable of supporting a caveat and could bind subsequent proprietors; however retention of the caveat had no practical value because the respondents lacked unanimous consent of all co-owners required to obtain exclusive use and there was no reasonable expectation that such consent would be obtained, so the court exercised its discretion under s143 to remove the caveat.