17 Nov 2022
The application for leave to bring a second appeal was declined because the proposed grounds challenge predominantly fact-based findings of the lower courts, do not raise any novel or important question of law capable of bona fide and serious argument, and are unlikely to succeed on appeal; suppression of the applicant's name was ordered to protect her identity.
7 May 2021
The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Family Court's exercise of discretion: the Judge properly found a breach of moral duty but awarded only such provision as necessary to repair that breach while respecting the testator's clear testamentary intentions; excluding the Newmarket apartment and the agreed $500,000 relationship payment from incidence was justified by the deceased's intention and the widow's caregiving, and awarding one third of the residue to the applicant (with the grandchildren each receiving one third) was within the permissible range and not plainly wrong.
5 Mar 2018
Award costs to defendants: allocate band C for steps relating to the interlocutory strikeout application and preparation of written submissions and band B for other steps; reduce defendants' subtotal by 20% to reflect unsuccessful strikeout of the PRA claim; apply a 40% uplift to the resulting subtotal because plaintiffs unreasonably pursued time-barred TPA and FPA claims and failed to act reasonably; award $892 for the costs memorandum (2B scale 0.4 day).
29 Apr 2016
The Court was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the 2008 document expressed the deceased's testamentary intentions and, given the statutory purpose of s14 and the residual nature of the discretion, there were no sufficient reasons to refuse validation; orders were made validating the 2008 document as the deceased's will.
23 Apr 2015
Interim injunctions were granted in part: the grandchildren (second and third plaintiffs) may remain in possession of Halkett and Cridges and retain machinery pending further order provided they pay assessed rent and all outgoings from 7 March 2015 (rent to be split half to the estate and half to Philip) and subject to lease terms as modified; Philip is restrained from entering those properties. The decision rests on preservation of the status quo to avoid irreparable harm to applicants, adequate compensation by rent, and the trustees' duty to obtain market rental pending final determination.
27 Jun 2014
On the facts the deceased owed an ongoing moral duty to maintain and support his adult children and a grandchild; by excluding them entirely and vesting the residuary estate in his wife he presumptively breached that duty; remedy required variation of the will to allocate meaningful shares to repair the breach; life interest was inappropriate given familial relationships; costs awards on category 3C scale were appropriate and uplift or indemnity costs were not justified.
26 Mar 2013
Neither cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel arises from the 1971 judgment because Wilson J's findings addressed only the then-claimants (who were capable of claiming) and did not determine or implicitly decide the rights of grandchildren or the validity of the power of appointment; the power of appointment issue fell away and was not necessary to the earlier decision.
23 Nov 2011
Appeal allowed in part: Family Court's division was excessively generous to the children given the existence and effect of the PAW Family Trust and other factual matrix; a moderate intervention to repair the breach of moral duty was sufficient — order modified so widow receives 64% of the residual estate and each respondent receives 12% of the residual estate.
8 Jun 2011
The Family Court can, at the inventory stage of Property (Relationships) Act and Family Protection Act proceedings, determine whether assets in the deceased's name are beneficially owned by one of the parties (including where trust issues arise between the parties); the High Court also has concurrent jurisdiction to determine ownership under general property law, but this High Court proceeding was an abuse of process because it duplicates pending Family Court proceedings and has caused delay, and accordingly the proceeding herein is stayed (with leave to resume if the Family Court cannot dete…