28 Nov 2018
Leave to proceed by way of originating application was granted because the respondent did not oppose the procedure and the primary issues were confined to whether a power existed under the lease to cancel in defined circumstances; although the background is factually dense, the court accepted the matter could proceed on originating application on that understanding.
29 Jun 2017
The Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the now‑moot appeal. The settlement removed any practical effect on the parties, the matter risked becoming an advisory opinion, the issue was not clearly a pure question of law free of factual context, judicial resources should not be expended on a test case divorced from facts, and the specialist Environment Court should be given further opportunity to address the point; accordingly the application for leave to proceed was dismissed.
19 Nov 2014
Leave to institute the proceeding was declined because the application was an abuse of process given its derivative nature from prior vexatious litigation and it lacked a prima facie case; the alleged past association between Dobson J and the Commissioner was remote and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
9 Sept 2013
Because both proceedings existed when the Full Court declared the applicant a vexatious litigant and directed that no civil proceeding instituted by him be continued without leave, and because the applicant had not obtained leave in one matter and had leave refused in the other, the Registrar was correct to refuse to receive the filings and the review is dismissed.
6 Mar 2013
Section 76(2) is limited to allowing proceedings that had already begun before adjudication to continue; it does not confer jurisdiction to commence fresh proceedings post-adjudication. On the facts, the proposed compensation claim against the bankrupt is a provable debt and leave to continue that claim under s 76(2) is declined. Declarations or prohibitory relief concerning directors' duties do not require leave. The Court granted time for submissions on the availability of s 237 as the appropriate statutory route to resolve disputed provable claims.
19 Dec 2011
Leave was granted because the plaintiff's delay was explained by a mistake upon legal advice of the type contemplated by s4(7) (mistake of law other than the subsection) and there was no evidence that the defendant had been materially prejudiced by the delay; defendant's withdrawal of opposition reinforced that conclusion.
23 Aug 2010
The Court adjourned the plaintiff's joinder application to be dealt with at the same time as the plaintiff's application for leave to proceed under the Limitation Act 1950, concluding that limitation issues are clearly relevant and the questions should be determined together to enable effective case management.