17 Dec 2015
The counterclaim for revocation remained a proper vehicle for seeking revocation despite the plaintiff's abandonment of the infringement claim; consequently the Court had jurisdiction under ordinary counterclaim principles (r 5.59) and revoked the patent, the plaintiff consenting to revocation.
17 Dec 2015
The court had jurisdiction to revoke the patent because the revocation claim was properly advanced as a counterclaim and r5.59 permits a defendant to proceed with a counterclaim despite the plaintiff abandoning the related cause of action; accordingly the Patent No 331966 was revoked.
10 Jun 2011
The threshold under r 5.45 was not met because the defendants failed to produce credible evidence of a serious risk that the plaintiff would be unable to pay costs; the judge accepted that the plaintiff had previously met costs when enforcement steps were taken, there was no adverse credit reporting, and it was likely the plaintiff would take steps to avoid personal insolvency despite the family home being held in a trust, so the risk of non-payment was not sufficiently established.
16 May 2011
Application refused because nearly all proposed evidence was not 'new' (could with reasonable diligence have been discovered earlier), much of it related to prior use which was not pleaded and thus irrelevant to the available grounds of appeal, and admission would produce a substantially new case undermining the statutory opposition process and interests of justice; revocation proceedings remain the correct vehicle for the substantive challenges.
7 Mar 2011
The Court held that by the priority date the common general knowledge included clear tapered wedges and clear adhesives; replacing rivet attachment with known clear adhesives to permit underlying frame colour to show through was an obvious and minor modification requiring no inventive step, therefore the claims lack inventive step and are not an "invention" under the Act; accordingly the Commissioner’s decision was set aside and the patent grant refused.
4 Mar 2011
The High Court upheld the Assistant Commissioner's determinations: the amendments to claims were permissible as explanatory/disclaimer, the skilled addressee was correctly characterised, the priority date is the provisional filing date (2 August 2002), the claimed method was not anticipated by the NZ Agrichemical Manual, the Cookson & Cornforth abstract or the SupaCrop brochure, prior uses relied on did not disclose the claimed method or purposes (Cookson/Cornforth trial; Saunders' SupaCrop use), the claimed method was not obvious to the skilled addressee on the prior art/uses, and the claime…
26 Aug 2010
The application to amend the Notice of Appeal was allowed because Ravensdown was already on notice of the prior use arguments (including those arising from the Cookson/Cornforth material and Saunders' evidence), would not be prejudiced, and could fairly meet the expanded grounds; accordingly leave to amend was granted.
20 Jul 2010
The defendants were entitled to further particulars identifying the farms and dairy organisations referred to in specified paragraphs of Mr Cook's affidavits because those particulars were necessary to meet the r 22.20 requirements and to enable investigation; the plaintiff must make further inquiries of its pivotal witness and supply whatever further information he can provide within six weeks, failing which the plaintiff will be bound by its existing particulars and r 22.24 will limit evidence.
27 Feb 2008
The court found that the Press publication disclosed the air-intake jacket around the flue (integer (c)) and that the claimed invention in Claims 1 and 10 is a combination of known elements which, given the prior art and common general knowledge, was obvious to a skilled but non-inventive person; accordingly Claims 1 and 10 are invalid for lack of inventive step under s 41(1)(f). Independently, the DVI-165 does not infringe because it lacks an exhaust duct at the top-front of the firebox (integer (b)) and does not have 'fins' as claimed in Claim 10.
9 Jul 2007
The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave, endorsing the appellate courts' conclusion that the respondent had demonstrated prior use sufficient to establish proprietorship of the trade mark and that the courts were entitled to reach a different legal conclusion from the Assistant Commissioner about the consequences of the factual findings; no question of law of public or general importance was established.