29 Mar 2022
The threshold in s 200(2)(a) was not satisfied because the harms claimed (financial loss, embarrassment, distress to family) are within the range of consequences normally attendant on criminal charges and fall short of the very high 'extreme hardship' standard; accordingly the balancing exercise would not clearly favour suppression and the application was dismissed (but interim suppression extended briefly).
24 Feb 2022
Applicant failed to prove extreme hardship under s 200(2)(a) because the evidence did not show a real and appreciable risk of suicide attributable to publication; custodial status, lack of major depressive disorder, limited publicity and availability of monitoring reduced risk. Accordingly continued suppression to trial was refused but a limited extension to 30 April 2022 was granted to allow rehabilitative steps.
9 Mar 2021
Leave to bring a second appeal and further evidence were permitted but the appeal was dismissed because the High Court correctly applied s 200: the judge validly accepted expert evidence of suicide risk but properly assessed that custodial risk management and likely dissipation of publicity by the time of release meant publication was not likely to cause extreme hardship or endanger safety; deferral to 30 April 2021 was an appropriate risk-management measure.
14 Oct 2020
The Court dismissed the appeal, holding the District Court judge did not err in finding an arguable case of extreme hardship sufficient for an interim suppression order on first appearance and in exercising his discretion to continue interim name suppression pending the defendants' next appearance because the balance of competing interests clearly favoured suppression in the circumstances.
3 Sept 2020
The High Court erred in discounting media and social media harms as not qualifying as 'hardship' when it had expressly found those harms to be severe; all identified harms must be considered cumulatively and, on the facts here — including the uniqueness of the appellant's name, the intense political and media context and the distinctive risks posed by social media and cancel culture to a young person — publication would cause extreme hardship under s 200(2)(a) CPA, and suppression should be granted; leave to appeal was therefore granted and the appeal allowed.
10 Jul 2020
The Court found the threshold was met: publication posed a real and appreciable risk to the appellant's safety (high suicide risk) and would likely lead to identification of family members already under suppression, and publication would likely cause extreme hardship to the appellant's daughter. Balancing the public interest in open justice against the real risk of devastating harm to the innocent daughter and the existing suppression of the family, the balance clearly favoured suppression. The District Court erred in refusing permanent name suppression; appeal allowed and permanent name supp…
5 Mar 2020
The High Court concluded that regardless of any jurisdictional complexities the appellant failed the s 200(2)(a) threshold because the evidence did not establish a likelihood of extreme hardship from publication; accordingly the discretionary balance favored publication and the appeal was dismissed.
7 Oct 2019
The appeal is dismissed because the s 200(2)(d) threshold was not met: extensive adverse publicity about Gloriavale was already in the public domain, the asserted similarities between offending did not create a real risk of juror contamination that could not be managed by judicial directions or takedown orders, and the proposed fresh evidence was neither fresh nor appropriate for admission on appeal.
11 Aug 2017
The District Court Judge erred in law by applying the 'undue hardship' standard (s 200(2)(b)/(c)) instead of the statutory 'extreme hardship' threshold in s 200(2)(a); the evidence did not establish extreme hardship nor sufficiently demonstrate that publication would endanger the safety of the dependent child under s 200(2)(e); accordingly there was no jurisdiction to make the permanent suppression order and the District Court order was quashed. The applicant, being over 18 and understanding the consequences, is permitted to have her name published under s 203(3)(b), and the identity of her f…