New Zealand Case Law: Decisions & Judgments

Topic

Unreasonableness (wednesbury)

Legal area

Court

30 Mar 2021

ZHAO v LEGAL COMPLAINTS REVIEW OFFICER [2021] NZHC 666

Citation

[2021] NZHC 666
Court

High Court

The LCRO's decision to strike out the review under s 205(1)(a) was not unreasonable: there was insufficient evidence that Duckworth had lied to the court, the more likely inference was an oversight based on client records, the continued demands and fee claims were matters between the Body Corporate and the applicant rather than misconduct by the lawyer, and no reviewable error or bias by the LCRO was established; judicial review dismissed and costs awarded to Duckworth.
15 Oct 2020

GREYMOUTH GAS TURANGI LTD v MINISTER OF ENERGY AND RESOURCES [2020] NZHC 2712 [15 October 2020]

Citation

[2020] NZHC 2712
Court

High Court

The Minister's delegate's decision of 6 March 2018 is quashed for material process failures and factual inaccuracies; reconsideration is ordered applying the law as at 6 March 2018 and an absolute assessment of Greymouth's proposed work programme such that the decision‑maker is to assess the bid on the basis that Greymouth is to be treated as likely to comply with its proposed work programme subject to negotiated assurance conditions; the April 2018 executive announcement (ban) is not declared unlawful.
19 Apr 2013

C v THE MEDICAL COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND HC WN CIV-2012-485-1977

Citation

openlaw-6f378604_982a_43c3_937a_c67e72620887.pdf
Court

High Court

The Council's decision was quashed because it was unreasonable: the Council accepted or adopted the PCC's recommendation without adequately addressing the fundamental factual issue (whether a doctor-patient relationship existed), failed to provide adequate reasons enabling the practitioner to understand the basis of the adverse finding, and should have afforded the practitioner a case-specific opportunity to be heard; although the Act allows ancillary arrangements for counselling, the decision in this case was procedurally and substantively flawed.
28 Feb 2013

NAIR V THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR HC NAP CIV-2012-441-364

Citation

openlaw-c7296ec6_c67d_4c33_8e37_15ed1e5a90d0.pdf
Court

High Court

Because s177 confers an absolute discretion and the immigration officer conducted a full interview, recorded the applicants' personal circumstances and relevant international obligations, and because the applicant did not establish predetermination, failure to take into account relevant considerations, or such unreasonableness that no reasonable immigration officer could have reached the decision, the High Court dismissed the judicial review application.
18 Feb 2013

SIEMER V OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE HC AK CIV-2010-404-1709

Citation

openlaw-632e2908_c249_4dd0_bcfa_faf91a4ba008.pdf
Court

High Court

The court allowed the amendment because the proposed Wednesbury unreasonableness ground could have been pleaded earlier in light of Toogood J's decision, the amendment would not require further evidence or cause undue prejudice or delay to the first respondent, and allowing it better served the interests of justice.
1 Apr 2009

CHEEMA & OTHERS V MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION AND ANOR HC AK CIV 2008-404-007469

Citation

openlaw-8a278108_0643_4fc0_841d_8255eaad5658.pdf
Court

High Court

The decision to refuse a further work permit was lawful and not so unreasonable that no reasonable immigration officer could have reached it: the officer legitimately considered the applicant's immigration history (including her recent expression of interest in residence), the integrity of the immigration system given the husband's fraud, and the children's interests, and afforded the applicant opportunity to respond; dismissal of the review follows.
18 Nov 2008

AIR NEW ZEALAND LIMITED AND ORS V WELLINGTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED HC WN CIV-2007-485-1756

Citation

openlaw-253e3ccb_f211_403d_b639_7b429103ef13.pdf
Court

High Court

The Court struck out all four newly pleaded grounds because they effectively required assessment of whether WIAL's charges produced monopoly profits—a matter for the Commerce Commission not judicial review; implied mandatory considerations were unsupported by s4A or the Act's scheme; substantive unfairness is not a free-standing ground beyond variable intensity unreasonableness; legitimate expectation could not be used to demand a particular substantive outcome absent clear reliance; and leave to reapply for summary judgment was declined because the rules preclude a second application in the…
5 Oct 2006

GIBBS V THE NEW PLYMOUTH DISTRICT COUNCIL HC NWP CIV 2004-443-115

Citation

openlaw-f89abc15_4ed2_4477_80b8_010f386aec84.pdf
Court

High Court

Costs should follow the event; Mr Gibbs' case did not attract a public interest exception because he expanded the litigation beyond the narrow legal point under s73(3) by alleging bias and irrationality, which lacked real prospects and increased time and expense; accordingly Mr Gibbs must pay costs to the Council on a 2B basis and pay the Association $2750 plus disbursements; no indemnity or increased costs ordered.
22 Mar 2006

KING FOO WONG V MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION HC AK CIV 2006-404-001490

Citation

openlaw-e7ce5eeb_19cc_4728_a739_4ca6fc7573b3.pdf
Court

High Court

The interim application was dismissed because the substantive proceedings disclosed no arguable cause of action: s9 makes temporary permits a discretionary matter so no legitimate expectation arose, the officer's decision was open on the evidence and consistent with statutory discretion, and no NZBORA breach or obligation to provide counsel before detention was established.