The High Court in Mwanza overruled preliminary objections in a land application, holding that a request for temporary orders was not a “suit” requiring statutory notice.
The High Court overruled a preliminary objection, holding that statutory notice to sue the Government was not a prerequisite for a Mareva injunction application.
The District Land and Housing Tribunal erred in dismissing the application for non-joinder of the Kenyana Village Council as a necessary party because neither the pleadings nor the respondents' claims established the village council as a necessary party. The dismissal was premature and not justified by the facts or law. The trial Chairman should have ascertained necessity before dismissal, and the law allows for joinder at any stage if justice requires.
The preliminary objections fail because the execution sought is in accordance with the deed of settlement and its variation, the amount is ascertainable as per the variation, and there is no government party or interest requiring application of the Government Proceedings Act. The objections do not raise pure points of law and are therefore overruled with costs.
High Court Land Division strike-out ruling on a land dispute, holding the suit incompetent for non-joinder of necessary parties and lack of 90 days’ notice.
The plaintiff did not serve the statutory notice of intention to sue to the Attorney General as required by section 6(2) of the Government Proceedings Act. Failure to serve the notice renders the suit incompetent and premature, warranting its striking out.
The High Court dismissed Tanzania Railways Corporation’s revision against a CMA award, holding that the Attorney General’s non-joinder was not fatal and the delayed award was still valid.
CMA is not a court under the Government Proceedings Act; Government and Attorney General cannot be sued in CMA; 90 days' notice does not extend time under Rule 10; Applicant, as a public servant, must exhaust local remedies under Public Service Act before seeking labour law remedies; application filed out of time must be dismissed, not struck out; notice of intention to file revision is mandatory and its omission renders the application incompetent.
The court held that it has inherent jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions pending institution of a suit under section 95 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the order sought was only against the 1st respondent (a private party), not government entities. The court found no prejudice to government respondents due to service of statutory notice only on the Attorney General, and determined it was just to maintain the status quo pending expiry of the ninety day notice.