5 Dec 2017
The trial judge’s failure to leave manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act was material: on the evidence (viewed most favourably to the accused) and in light of the jury’s specific questions, a properly directed jury could have returned that alternative verdict; the omission rendered the conviction unsafe, so the conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered.
28 Dec 2011
The judge admitted the Deputy High Court Judge's judgment and the charge sheets as fresh documentary evidence because they arose after the close of the parties' case but before judgment, are relevant to the credibility of the witness (Mr Aggarwal), and the probative value for assessing the weight of his evidence justified admission despite lack of direct issue relevance to the pleaded transaction; exclusion would be unduly restrictive of the interests of justice.
11 Jul 2006
The conviction was upheld because the trial judge, having observed witnesses and fully assessed credibility, rejected the applicant's evidence and alibi as lies, accepted the accomplice's testimony as truthful after considering the risks, and did not impermissibly infer guilt from previous convictions; accordingly the verdict was safe.
3 Oct 2003
Where a witness observed the defendant face‑to‑face at close range for several seconds with adequate lighting and prior public familiarity explains recognition, the identification was reliable and the conviction is safe; prosecution questioning about public profile did not amount to improper bad character evidence; the police computer entry was not used as corroboration; and the sentencing judge acted within proper discretion and applied the totality principle, so sentences stand.
27 Aug 2002
The court held that once the defendant placed his character in issue the prosecution's cross-examination on previous convictions was permissible and had been conducted with restraint; the summing up, read as a whole, fairly directed the jury including on credibility, burden of proof and flight, no specific lies direction was required because alleged lies bore only on credibility, and any loose phraseology was not materially prejudicial; therefore the conviction was safe and the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
10 Feb 1999
The magistrate's refusal to recall Madam Chan was within his discretion and not prejudicial because the relevant bad character was put to the correct witness; the magistrate properly considered credibility, applied the required cautionary direction as to previous convictions, and having seen and heard witnesses his verdict was safe and should not be overturned on appeal.
6 Mar 1998
The appeal is dismissed because the magistrate's findings on credibility and fact were rationally based on the evidence and medical reports; the prior conviction was elicited by the defence and was admissible as background rather than relied upon as proof of guilt; and the sentences imposed, including activation of the suspended sentence, were appropriate having regard to the appellant's record and the nature of the offences.
18 Feb 1998
The Court dismissed the applications: juror drowsiness did not invalidate the trial because the judge monitored and intervened and no counsel applied for discharge; the judge properly directed the jury on assessing credibility and on bad character exceptions; the evidence (including circumstantial) sufficed to support convictions; and the sentences, including 13 years for arson and a total of 14 years for D1, were within lawful bounds given multiple aggravating features.
14 Nov 1997
Because the defence deliberately elicited the evidence about the witness's bad character and association with the accused, the trial judge's concise and balanced directions sufficiently countered any potential prejudice and there was no miscarriage of justice; accordingly leave to appeal against conviction was refused and the sentence was affirmed.
25 Oct 1996
The application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence is dismissed because the trial judge correctly directed the jury on the s47 presumptions and the standard to rebut them, properly treated the medical remark as irrelevant without requiring further summing-up, there was no material irregularity in proceeding after the applicant dismissed counsel, and the 25 year sentence was within established guidelines given the quantity and street value of the heroin.