28 Jan 2026
The leave application was dismissed because the core dispute was a private civil trustees' dispute not amenable to public law judicial review; having weighed the parties' positions and the public interest elements, the court exercised its discretion to order the applicant to pay 50% of the MPFA's costs, summarily assessed at HK$140,000.
14 Dec 2022
The summons was dismissed because Order 15 r.6A was misapplied in the circumstances, no person willing to represent the deceased Defendant's estate had been identified, and Messrs Chan & Chan were not appropriate addressees for service; accordingly the applicant was ordered to bear the costs personally and the scheduled appeal hearing was vacated pending appointment of a proper representative.
29 Nov 2022
The court held that reasonable administration costs and disbursements incurred by the administrator are payable out of the estate and ordered accordingly subject to section 60; applications to authorise retention of solicitors and Beddoe relief in relation to the Intended Discovery and Joinder applications were premature while a related appeal remained outstanding and were adjourned sine die with liberty to restore; consequential costs orders were made directing payment out of the estate with taxation provisions.
29 Jan 2015
Plaintiff must pay the successful defendants' costs personally; she is not entitled to indemnity from the estate because a notional Beddoe application would not have been granted given the nature of the intra-family dispute and her personal interest in pursuing the claims; a short hearing is ordered to consider apportionment of costs below; the 6th defendant's application for leave to the Court of Final Appeal is dismissed for failure to prove the as-of-right valuation threshold, for raising new GPI points not previously run, for lack of locus and as an abuse of process; indemnity costs again…
14 Mar 2011
The Court refused the extension of time because the delay was substantial and wholly inexcusable and the proposed appeal lacked the requisite merit to overcome that delay; accordingly leave to appeal the costs order was also refused and the judge's conclusions on trust construction and awarding indemnity costs were not disturbed given the judge's evidential findings and discretion.
10 Dec 2010
The 2nd defendant (trustee) defended the proceedings unreasonably and for its own financial benefit (protecting trustee fees) and therefore must pay the plaintiff's and the 1st defendant's costs on an indemnity basis personally; the trustee cannot recover those costs from the trust estate.
4 Aug 2006
The Court held that the Costs Orders required common fund taxation of the respondents' own costs and authorised an interim payment of $40 million out of the Fund to meet those costs pending recovery from the Secretary for Justice; the Orders were not intended to and do not affect contractual relations between the respondents and their solicitors nor the solicitors' right to have their bills taxed, and no further clarification or setting aside was required.
11 Oct 2004
The court refused a broad pre-emptive costs order but directed the applicant in its capacity as executor and trustee under the Will to clarify its capacities, seek joinder of the trustee of Karen Trust if not yet joined, remain neutral by filing a defence submitting to the court's directions and making discovery, and held that all reasonable costs properly incurred in that neutral role are to be borne by the estate; other pre-emptive protection was denied and parties granted liberty to apply.
21 Jun 2000
The trustee (administrator) did not act unreasonably or for its own benefit; the litigation and subsequent application for leave to appeal were properly brought to protect the estate on counsel's advice and were not speculative. Therefore under Order 62 r.6(2) the Administrator is entitled to be indemnified out of the Estate for all costs incurred and for costs ordered to be paid to John Lee, including the costs of the application for leave to appeal.
15 Jul 1999
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals: the judge had jurisdiction to direct the Official Receiver to secure assistance, she did not misapply her discretion in ordering a law costs draftsman or in requiring a banker's guarantee for large interim payments, and there were no exceptional circumstances warranting appellate interference with her case-management directions and discretionary orders.