10 Mar 2025
On re‑hearing the court found an innocent explanation (distraction by phone, gesture by a third party and appellant's documented mental condition and good character) was reasonably possible such that the court was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had dishonest intent; conviction was therefore unsafe and quashed.
14 Sept 2017
The trial judge's evaluation of the victim's testimony and CCTV evidence was entitled to deference; the appellant failed to prove a genuine honest belief that the phone was abandoned and the explanation was implausible, therefore the conviction was safe and must be upheld.
11 Aug 2006
Given the accepted evidence that the appellant brought the store's plastic bag into the store, placed items into it on multiple occasions, was stopped and admitted taking items, and that his account of mistake was implausible, the magistrate properly inferred dishonest intent and convicted; possession of money and academic achievements did not rebut the inference and the appellate court will not disturb these factual findings.
1 Nov 2005
The appellate judge upheld the magistrate's credibility findings and concluded that the appellant's cold and medication did not negate his capacity to form dishonest intent given the short intervening time and the trial evidence; accordingly the conviction was safe and the appeal was dismissed.
22 Jun 2005
The magistrate was entitled to find the bicycle was not abandoned because it was locked and therefore remained the owner's property, and to infer dishonesty from the appellant's inconsistent statements and admission of greed; the record was properly admitted and the conviction was safe.
5 Dec 1980
Appeal allowed in part: convictions based on the prospectus (Counts 1,3,5 and alternates 2,4,6) were set aside because the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's plausible honest belief arising from reliance on professional advisers; alternate Companies Ordinance convictions likewise could not stand for same reason; convictions based on bogus bills (Counts 7–14) were affirmed because the evidence permitted the only proper inference that banks were deceived and there was no credible evidence of bank collusion.