14 Apr 2026
Sexual gratification on the part of the offender is not an essential element of the offence under s.146; the prosecution must prove the defendant intended to commit or incite the grossly indecent act 'with or towards' a child but need not prove an intention to obtain sexual gratification; 'with' and 'towards' do not create distinct offences in the context of s.146.
9 Mar 2026
The appellate court, on re-trial of the evidence, found the prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had the requisite subjective intent to cause fear when he sent the short, partly hypothetical voice message; given the recent quarrel, volume of calls and potential emotional agitation, the statement could have been an impulsive outburst rather than a deliberate threat, so conviction was unsafe.
4 Feb 2026
Bail pending appeal refused because the applicant failed to demonstrate the requisite exceptional circumstances: his proposed appeals do not have a reasonable (let alone extremely high) prospect of success and the sentence is not manifestly excessive; the trial judge lawfully rejected the applicant's account and was entitled to infer mens rea from the overwhelming transactional evidence.
22 Dec 2025
The court found that draft grounds alleging reversal of onus and failure to apply Harjani disclose sufficient merit to constitute exceptional circumstances on the merits; given those concerns about the legality of the trial judge's reasoning and the credibility findings, the applicant was granted bail pending appeal subject to bail terms to be fixed.
10 Nov 2025
The court accepted the uncontested evidence of the applicant's previous counsel and contemporaneous signed meeting records showing the applicant was properly and repeatedly advised of the charges and the element that the goods were dangerous drugs; the applicant's later inconsistent allegations of believing the goods were dog food and of police coercion were not credible, amounted to fabrication, were raised belatedly, and therefore did not justify permitting withdrawal of the guilty plea.
17 Oct 2025
Leave to appeal was refused because the trial judge correctly applied legal principles: identification was properly found on the cumulative evidence with appropriate caution, the judge lawfully inferred a conspiracy from conduct and planning, she addressed and found the requisite specific intent for conspiracy to wound (not conflating foresight with intent), and the grounds advanced were not reasonably arguable.
25 Sept 2025
The court held there was a sufficient nexus among the three money‑laundering charges (overlapping timeframes, accounts held/operated by the defendant, similar laundering features, interlinked sequence of events and arrests, and common relevance of defendant's knowledge and conduct) and that consolidation would avoid duplication without causing unfair prejudice because each count will be considered separately; accordingly consolidation was granted under Cap.221 s18(1) and Cap.221C r7.
25 Sept 2025
The court found a sufficient nexus among the three laundering charges—common nature, overlapping time periods, same account operator, typical laundering features and relevant sequence that bears on mens rea—and concluded consolidation would not cause unfair prejudice because each count will be considered separately; efficiency and overlapping evidence justify consolidation under Cap.221 s18(1) and Cap.221C r7.
9 Sept 2025
On a full rehearing of the evidence the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that (1) the person who met PW1 and PW2 was the appellant; (2) PW2 was acting as an agent of the deceased for funeral‑related matters by virtue of the P3 instrument and conduct; (3) the appellant made an offer of HK$3,000 as a rebate/commission connected to the deceased's funeral arrangements; and (4) the appellant intended the benefit to influence PW2 in her role as agent—therefore the conviction under s9(2)(a) Cap.201 is safe and the appeal is dismissed.
3 Sept 2025
On a full re‑hearing the judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant possessed the requisite intent to cause fear; the single hypothetical threatening sentence, considered with the surrounding facts (high emotion, lack of assaultive movement despite holding a golf club, ongoing contractual relationship), left reasonable doubt as to mens rea and therefore the conviction could not stand.