Hong Kong Case Law: Decisions & Judgments | LexChat

Hong Kong Case Law

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  • 6 May 2022

    HKSAR v. MANAN ABDUL

    Citation
    [2022] HKCA 479
    Court
    Court of Appeal
    Case number
    CACC64/2019

    Hoang: the judge's remarks about absence of fingerprints were appropriate in the factual context and did not amount to a material misdirection. Manan: the trial judge erred by directing the jury that the absence of fingerprints "proves nothing one way or the other" in circumstances where the absence was a central, contested, and relevant fact relied upon by the defence; that direction amounted to usurpation of the jury's fact-finding role, so Manan's conviction was unsafe and was quashed; grounds on good character and interpreter assistance failed on the facts; retrial ordered and proviso ref…

  • 26 Jul 2017

    HKSAR v. CHAN MAN SUM, IVAN

    Citation
    HKSAR v. CHAN MAN SUM, IVAN
    Court
    Court of Appeal
    Case number
    CACC273/2015

    The trial judge materially misdirected the jury by failing to clearly instruct that an adverse inference from circumstantial evidence may only be drawn if it is the only reasonable inference from the proved facts; that misdirection was not cured by other remarks in the summing up, was material and required quashing of the conviction; the proviso was inapplicable and a retrial was ordered.

  • 9 Mar 2015

    HKSAR v. TABAGUA VALERIAN

    Citation
    HKSAR v. TABAGUA VALERIAN
    Court
    Court of Appeal
    Case number
    CACC238/2014

    The trial judge materially erred by treating admissible evidence of what was communicated to the applicant (notably Mr Palienko's evidence about documents and the rescission agreement) as hearsay and by failing to consider those grounds when applying the s25 test; that omission was a material irregularity, the proviso does not apply, and the conviction must be quashed.

  • 6 Jun 2014

    HKSAR v. LO CHUN SIU

    Citation
    HKSAR v. LO CHUN SIU
    Court
    Court of Appeal
    Case number
    CACC90/2013

    Court held that psychiatrists may testify about the nature, severity and functional effects of ADHD and how impulsivity can impair self-control but may not pronounce on the ultimate legal question whether the abnormality 'substantially impaired' mental responsibility; the trial judge erred by directing jury to ignore ADHD in assessing provocation (both subjective limb and gravity assessment) and failing to instruct that ADHD-related characteristics could be considered when assessing gravity; that misdirection was material and could not be cured by applying the proviso; appeal allowed, convict…

  • 15 Sept 2010

    VIVIEN FAN AND OTHERS v. HKSAR

    Citation
    VIVIEN FAN AND OTHERS v. HKSAR
    Court
    Court of Final Appeal
    Case number
    FAMC29/2010

    The Court granted leave to the respective applicants and to the prosecution to pursue specified grounds under s.32(2); leave was generally granted under the substantial and grave injustice limb to enable fresh argument on factual misapprehension, admissibility of documents, the proviso, and inferential reasoning, and in Rahman's case also under the point of law limb to challenge any alleged duty of a non‑director to act as a whistle‑blower.

  • 15 Sept 2010

    VIVIEN FAN AND OTHERS v. HKSAR

    Citation
    VIVIEN FAN AND OTHERS v. HKSAR
    Court
    Court of Final Appeal
    Case number
    FAMC25/2010

    The Court granted leave to appeal selectively under s.32(2) on the substantial and grave injustice limb in most instances and on both limbs for Mr Rahman where a pure point of law was raised; leave was granted to the parties and the prosecution to pursue specified grounds (mistaken factual findings, admission of documents, proviso application, tacit agreement, duty to whistle-blow and related evidential matters) and to have those issues reviewed by the Court of Final Appeal.

  • 15 Sept 2010

    VIVIEN FAN AND OTHERS v. HKSAR

    Citation
    VIVIEN FAN AND OTHERS v. HKSAR
    Court
    Court of Final Appeal
    Case number
    FAMC28/2010

    The Court granted leave to appeal to the specified applicants largely under the substantial and grave injustice limb of s.32(2), and in one instance also under the point of law limb, because arguable errors existed concerning admitted evidence, factual inferences (including tacit agreement and post‑conspiracy conduct), application of the proviso and a legal point about whistle‑blower obligations for non‑director employees; the grants were for the limited purpose of permitting those issues to be fully argued before the Court of Final Appeal, not to decide guilt or liability at this stage.

  • 15 Sept 2010

    VIVIEN FAN AND OTHERS v. HKSAR

    Citation
    VIVIEN FAN AND OTHERS v. HKSAR
    Court
    Court of Final Appeal
    Case number
    FAMC30/2010

    The Court granted leave to appeal to the specified applicants predominantly under the substantial and grave injustice limb (and in Rahman's case also on the point of law limb) to permit full consideration of claimed errors: factual mistakes about documentary evidence of the Executive Committee's purpose, wrongful admission of internal bank documents under the co-conspirators rule, incorrect inferences of tacit agreement and guilty knowledge, improper imposition of a whistle-blower duty on a non-director, and misapplication of the proviso; the prosecution was granted leave to appeal the quashi…

  • 14 May 2010

    LO KWONG YIN v. HKSAR

    Citation
    LO KWONG YIN v. HKSAR
    Court
    Court of Final Appeal
    Case number
    FAMC5/2010

    The Court held that the Court of Appeal correctly applied the proviso by using the inevitability test, that the applicant's contention that the conviction was not inevitable was not reasonably arguable, and therefore leave to appeal was refused; additionally, counsel's written reasons certifying prospects should not be placed before the Court in future.

  • 16 Apr 2009

    NANCY ANN KISSEL v. HKSAR

    Citation
    NANCY ANN KISSEL v. HKSAR
    Court
    Court of Final Appeal
    Case number
    FAMC64/2008

    Leave to appeal was granted limited to (a) Ground 1 on both the point of law limb and the substantial and grave injustice limb with the Court substituting a certified question concerning the extent and purpose for which prosecution may cross-examine a defendant using materials relied on in bail applications, and (b) Grounds 2 and 3 on the substantial and grave injustice limb; leave was refused on other grounds.