16 May 2019
The appeal is allowed in part because although the respondent's contempt was grave and warranted immediate imprisonment, the sentencing court failed to articulate appropriate weight for the respondent's youth; proper starting point is 3 months' imprisonment reduced by one-third for admission and apology, resulting in a substituted sentence of 2 months' imprisonment.
15 Jul 2016
The Court held the judge's stated starting point of 14 years was manifestly excessive given the appellant's lesser culpability relative to the principal perpetrators and her youth and dominant influence factors; the appropriate starting point is 12 years and, applying the 50% discount the judge allowed for the appellant's substantial assistance to the prosecution, substituted a final sentence of 6 years' imprisonment, quashing the original 7-year sentence.
4 May 2016
Applicant failed to prove by credible evidence that his filing of the Notice of Abandonment was not a deliberate and informed act; the Notice plainly stated its effect and the applicant demonstrated sufficient command of English; therefore the abandonment stands and the application is refused.
7 Mar 2016
No error was shown in the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion: the judge correctly assessed culpability (group, premeditated, weapons used, injuries), set appropriate starting points (5 years for charges 1 & 2; 3 years 6 months for charge 3), applied one-third reduction for guilty pleas, correctly ordered concurrency for charges 1 and 2 and partial consecutivity for charge 3, applied the totality principle to fix an aggregate sentence of 4 years imprisonment; leave to appeal was therefore refused.
23 Jun 2015
The sentencing judge erred in equating the instant case to Habib Hashan because abduction and the attendant aggravating features in that precedent were absent; the applicants were better described as new acquaintances rather than trusted friends so breach of trust was not a significant aggravating factor; the judge did not fail to consider youth but the appropriate starting point is 8 years, not 9, and the Court substituted 8 years imprisonment for each appellant.
6 Jun 2013
The trial judge correctly identified individual starting points but erred in his method of aggregating across charges and ordering part of a sentence consecutive so as to manufacture an overall total without properly applying the totality principle and considering offender circumstances; accordingly the sentences were quashed and substituted to reflect each offence's added culpability and overall totality, and extension of time to seek leave to appeal was granted.
18 Nov 2011
The sentencing judge erred by failing to distinguish between the culpability of the ringleader (D1) who delivered the fatal and particularly vicious blow and the lesser roles of D2 and D3; accordingly the court allowed the appeals and substituted lower, differentiated sentences for D2 and D3 (D2: 5 years; D3: 6 years) while upholding the need for deterrence in triad-related planned attacks.
17 Sept 2010
The magistrate did not err in law or fact in applying the 15-month guideline sentence; the appellant's age and background did not constitute humanitarian or exceptional circumstances sufficient to warrant a reduced sentence, therefore the appeal is dismissed and the 15 months imprisonment is affirmed.
25 Sept 2008
The Court held that the judge's starting point of 24 years was appropriate for the quantity of heroin involved; a one‑third reduction for a timely guilty plea to reach 16 years was correct; the applicant's age and foreign status did not justify further reduction; therefore the sentence was not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive and leave to appeal was refused.
23 Nov 2006
The sentencing judge's starting points of 10 years for each robbery were justified by the use of an imitation firearm, threats and the fear caused (including risk to a two‑year‑old); the discounts applied for guilty plea, youth and clear record produced concurrent reductions and the overall total sentence of 10 years (two consecutive 5‑year terms) was not manifestly excessive, so the application for leave to appeal against sentence must be dismissed.