15 Aug 2023
The application for leave to appeal was refused because the applicant failed to show a seriously arguable error of law: the Tribunal's factual findings and the weight it gave to medical and family evidence about dementia progression, care options in China, and the daughter's intentions were open on the evidence and did not amount to errors of law sufficient to justify leave under s245.
1 Aug 2023
Liability for interim maintenance under s82 was not plainly wrong and is upheld, but the Family Court erred in the process used to determine quantum by failing to allow for the respondent's reasonably anticipated earnings during the interim period and by permitting weekly finance payments for a vehicle; remedy is reduction of weekly interim maintenance from $1,345 to $760 (total $19,760) rather than quashing and remittal.
5 Jul 2023
The High Court held on de novo appeal that appellant had engaged in mismanagement by commissioning and permitting contractor works and incurring significant liabilities without clear title or assured funding, failing to protect creditor interests and prioritising personal interests; that mismanagement contributed to BBG's failure and posed a future public risk; the Deputy Registrar's decision to prohibit was substantively correct but several factual findings overstated seriousness, so the prohibition was reduced from four years to three years.
21 Oct 2021
The Court granted a short extension of time and permission to amend the leave application but declined leave to appeal because the proposed appeal raised no issue of law or fact of general or public importance, the matters were case‑specific, appellate standards on review and natural justice are settled and the proposed appeal had low prospects of success (further diminished by the expiry of the restraining order).
27 Jul 2020
The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal so the Court can determine whether the Court of Appeal was correct to dismiss the appeal, and to hear argument on admissibility of prior negotiations and subsequent conduct and on the proper test for implying terms; the existing Zurich principles remain undisturbed for the purpose of this leave decision.
30 Apr 2020
Leave to appeal was granted and the Supreme Court framed the single approved question for determination: whether the Court of Appeal ought to have allowed the applicant's appeal; the Court required submissions to specifically address the impact, if any, of the omission of the proviso from s 232 on appellate review as discussed in Wiley v R.
5 Mar 2020
The High Court concluded that regardless of any jurisdictional complexities the appellant failed the s 200(2)(a) threshold because the evidence did not establish a likelihood of extreme hardship from publication; accordingly the discretionary balance favored publication and the appeal was dismissed.
14 Oct 2019
The High Court held Ms S did not meet the s17(1) threshold because her contributions were paid employment or minimal, one-off financial acts, and not shown to have preserved or kept PCL going; therefore the Family Court's award of $326,300 under s17 was legally erroneous and is quashed.
27 Sept 2019
Leave to appeal was refused because no sufficiently arguable question of law was identified: the High Court found the District Court did not err in applying s110 given the available evidence; s86(2)(a) and (b) do not inevitably require a strict sequential approach and may be considered together in appropriate cases; there was no demonstrable failure by ACC to assess vocational rehabilitation in the way alleged; and the proposed additional appellate standard point was outside the leave granted and not sufficiently arguable.
31 Jul 2019
The High Court dismissed the appeal: the Authority did not err in law in refusing to admit the updating evidence (it was not fresh, cogent or material to alter the Committee's finding), the Committee's assessment that the appellant was unsuitable to operate an off-licence in evening high-risk hours was reasonably open on the evidence (past CPO failures, incidents, locality risk), and the 6 pm trading-hours condition was a proportionate, non-capricious regulatory measure within the Act's legitimate powers; economic prejudice and comparison with other licensees were not required considerations…