4 Oct 2023
Leave to bring a second appeal was denied because the proposed appeal did not raise any matter of general or public importance and there was no realistic prospect of demonstrating a miscarriage of justice given the concurrent findings of the District and High Courts that the object was a firearm and the sufficiency of the evidential basis for conviction.
18 Mar 2021
Leave for a second appeal is declined because the applicant failed to demonstrate a real risk of miscarriage of justice: the trial Judge's admissions rulings on hearsay and propensity were within legal bounds, the inferences from DNA, stolen property, CCTV and modus operandi were permissible and sufficient to support convictions, and the sentence (including uplift for prior offending and minimum period) was not manifestly excessive.
10 Nov 2020
The Deputy Registrar's conduct in allocating CRN/CRI numbers, setting a first-call date and facilitating issuance of a summons constituted acceptance for filing under s26(1)(a) Criminal Procedure Act 2011; once accepted for filing a Judge no longer had jurisdiction under s26(1)(b) to reject the charging documents and s33 triggered the obligation to issue a summons; accordingly the District Court Judge's decision rejecting the charges was set aside and the charges are deemed accepted for filing on 5 September 2018.
6 Apr 2020
Failure of the trial Judge to provide reasons for the finding of guilt rendered the trial unfair and amounted to a miscarriage of justice; further, on the evidence before the court, the prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant possessed the cannabis for the purpose of sale given her exculpatory explanation, the quantity and packaging alone were insufficient indicators of sale, and there were no other indicia of dealing; accordingly the conviction was quashed and no retrial ordered.
20 Mar 2020
The Judge’s findings that the appellant knew the phone was not hers, acted dishonestly in retaining or dealing with it, and intended to permanently deprive the owner were supported by the evidence (smartphone v push‑button phone, statements about giving it to her son, U‑turn and failure to return) and therefore the conviction under s219(1)(b) was sound and the appeal must be dismissed.
7 May 2019
The Court held the application for leave to bring a second appeal must be declined because the issues raised were factual assessments properly resolved by the District and High Courts, the High Court had addressed the same grounds and there was no real risk of a miscarriage of justice if leave was refused.
13 Mar 2019
There was sufficient evidence from which a properly directed jury could reasonably conclude that Ms Doyle moved and concealed the vehicle knowing and intending that she was assisting persons who had seriously injured Mr Harris, and that she knew of his death when she placed the keys in the letterbox; therefore the discharge application under s147 must be dismissed and the matter proceed to trial.
28 Nov 2018
Extension of time to apply for leave was granted but leave to bring a second appeal was declined because the propensity evidence was properly admissible, the similarities in modus operandi were striking and, together with CCTV, fingerprint, vehicle and Facebook evidence, were sufficient to support the convictions; the matter did not raise a question of general or public importance and there was no risk of miscarriage of justice.
9 Aug 2018
The Court held the Family Court judge correctly found a moral duty was breached, that the evidence (affidavits and disclosed documents) was sufficient to establish Keith Parker's need for maintenance, and that the discretionary awards of $100,000 to Helen Tigg and $175,000 to Keith Parker were within the available range and not plainly wrong on appeal; accordingly the appeal was dismissed.
21 Jun 2018
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction because the photographs and the manner in which they were taken were not indecent in their nature and the surrounding circumstances relied upon (motive, surreptitiousness, zoom lens, prior incidents, organisation of other images) could not, by themselves, convert otherwise non-indecent photographic acts into an indecent act under s126; consequently the Crown had insufficient evidence on the actus reus (indecent act) and it was inappropriate to order a retrial.