21 Mar 2023
The Board erred in law by treating 'totally blind' in s 34(a) as requiring permanence and by relying on the availability of future interventional treatments; entitlement under s 34(a) is to be assessed by reference to the applicant's current blindness and not by whether it may be curable in future.
24 May 2022
On the evidence, including an expert health assessor report showing enduring sexual deviance, compulsivity, limited self-regulation, high actuarial risk scores and limited treatment progress, the statutory criteria in s107I and s107IAA were satisfied; a 10-year ESO (the statutory maximum) was the minimum period required for community safety; the Court may direct the Parole Board to impose an intensive monitoring condition for up to 12 months when making an ESO and prior intensive monitoring under an interim order does not preclude such a direction nor compel deduction of earlier time, althoug…
8 Jun 2021
The University was the successful party and no special circumstances justified departure from the ordinary rule; however, costs were reduced because second counsel was not certified and preparation time (step 32) was reduced from two days to one day due to an identifiable shift in the University's oral submissions concerning 'eligibility'; accordingly costs awarded to the University against the Applicant in the sum of NZD 18,274 (including NZD 110 disbursement).
6 Aug 2019
The Court found the claim met the Act's eligibility criteria and that transfer to the Tribunal was in the interests of justice because the Tribunal's statutory purpose, procedural flexibility, potential cost savings (including avoidance of High Court fees and access to Tribunal-funded experts and mediation), and likely lack of duplication outweighed the risk of short initial delay or the defendant's complexity argument; the Tribunal retains power to refer novel or complex legal questions back to the High Court under s 53.
19 Jun 2019
The Level 3 limitation in the operational Guidelines was inconsistent with the Programme Schedule and exceeded the power conferred in cl 6(2A); accordingly the Guidelines unlawfully fettered the Chief Executive's discretion and are invalid.
8 May 2017
The appellant has no entitlement to weekly compensation because she had nil earnings in the relevant tax year and failed to prove she was either full-time self-employed or liable to pay the minimum levy under regulation 7; therefore clauses 38(2), 38(3) and 42 cannot operate in her favor and the reviewer correctly quashed the Corporation's 6 March 2013 decision rendering the suspension moot.
19 Aug 2016
The Authority and Chief Executive correctly applied s61G and Schedule 2: loan repayments cannot be included as allowable essential costs because the financed items are not within Schedule 2 categories and no written evidence of agreed period or revolving credit arrangements was provided; accordingly the Authority did not err in law and temporary additional support was correctly declined.
14 Jun 2016
Section 141(4) applies to the new multi-unit complex claim as a whole such that, where a 2002 Act claimant withdraws to join a new claim and the new claim is brought within one year, section 37 treats the new claim as if it were brought on the date of the withdrawn 2002 Act claim; accordingly the new claim does not have to independently meet the s 16(a) 10-year eligibility window in that circumstance and all claimants in the new claim benefit from the preserved date.
11 Sept 2013
The Chief Executive's evaluation that the student accommodation units qualified as "dwellinghouses" was within statutory powers and supported by the assessors' reports and was not plainly wrong; however, the Chief Executive could not compel the participating territorial authority (Auckland Council) to make a contribution — the Council retains the decision whether to enter into the specific Homeowner/contribution agreement and so determine its own contribution liability; relief on remedies was deferred and proceedings were adjourned for further case management.
30 Mar 2012
The Authority correctly interpreted s 89(1)(a) to require availability, willingness and reasonable job‑seeking beyond incumbent Community Board duties; sufficient evidence supported the finding that the appellant was not available or willing and had not taken reasonable steps, and therefore he was not eligible for an ordinary or hardship unemployment benefit under s 90; appeal dismissed.