17 Apr 2020
Leave to appeal was refused because the matters raised were largely factual, did not raise questions of general or public importance, and did not demonstrate a risk of miscarriage of justice under s 74(2) of the Senior Courts Act 2016; accordingly there was no proper basis to grant leave and the Court dismissed the application and ordered costs.
18 Dec 2019
The court found on the balance of probabilities that Melrose retained ownership of the CAD drawings, Trade Mark Drawing and Waiwera Artesian Logo under the 2005 memorandum of understanding and had validly terminated permission to use those works; the Waiwera Group and named counterclaim defendants continued to copy, distribute and authorise manufacture of infringing bottles and copies and thereby infringed Melrose's copyright and breached s9 of the Fair Trading Act; accordingly declarations, injunctions, delivery up orders and transfer of specified trade mark registrations were warranted, whi…
8 Sept 2017
The Court held on the balance of probabilities that: (1) payments by Columbus Jan–May 2010 were a redirection of licence fees owed to NCI under a legitimate Nov09 licence and were made with NCI's knowledge/consent; (2) payments by MSH2 Sep–Nov 2010 were effectively loans to NCI (MSH2 a wholly owned subsidiary acting for NCI) and made with NCI's knowledge; (3) NCI was unable to pay its due debts at the relevant times; (4) the payments therefore constituted insolvent transactions by NCI within s292 and were voidable; accordingly the payments totalling $751,941.52 were set aside and RJH ordered…
17 Aug 2016
The appeal is allowed because the Associate Judge's uncontested factual finding that Time3 was not a creditor was open on the evidence; without a creditor/debtor relationship the transaction could not be set aside under s295, and the liquidator also failed to prove any transfer of intellectual property such as would support an order under s298, so the order directing transfer back was quashed and the cross-appeal dismissed.
5 Mar 2010
The application for leave was declined because the principal issues raised were essentially factual and involved the Employment Court's factual findings about ownership and scope of the 2003 agreement and creation of IP in employment; there was no arguable error of law of sufficient general or public importance to justify this Court's intervention under s214.