9 Nov 2021
Leave was granted because the public protection objective could be met by robust conditions and the applicant was essential to the companies' continued operation; deliberate past offending and risk of repetition were mitigated by required independent accounting controls, certification and an automatic rescission clause for breaches; appointment of an independent director was impracticable in the circumstances.
28 Jun 2021
The court found the respondent had a pervasive pattern of serious sexual offending and qualified under s107IAA (intense sexual drive, predilection for serious sexual offending, limited self-regulation, lack of empathy), actuarial tools and assessor reports established a very high risk of future relevant sexual offending, and because there was no adequate release plan or treatment engagement to mitigate that risk the minimum period required for community safety was the maximum available; accordingly a 10-year ESO was made, the Parole Board was ordered to impose an intensive monitoring conditio…
24 May 2021
Leave to appeal was dismissed because the applicant's arguments either lacked sufficient prospect of success on the facts or were essentially fact‑specific and not of sufficient general or public importance to justify Supreme Court consideration; suppression was continued briefly until 2 pm on 25 May 2021 to allow the applicant to communicate the result.
3 Jun 2020
The appellant failed to establish any threshold in s200(2) CPA: the psychological evidence, being largely self-reported and uncorroborated, did not show a real and appreciable risk to safety or extreme hardship; available protective factors (family support, ongoing psychological treatment, employment) and prior publicity meant the presumption of open justice was not displaced, so name suppression was refused and the appeal dismissed (with short interim suppression to allow filing for leave to appeal).
10 Jul 2019
The District Court's decision to refuse final name suppression was correct: the appellant's significant hardships arose from the offending, conviction and other incidents independently of publication, and she did not establish the required causal connection to meet the s200(2) threshold of likely extreme hardship; accordingly suppression was not justified and the interim order was revoked.