24 Jul 2014
The judge materially misdirected the jury by concluding manslaughter did not arise and failing to leave manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act as an alternative verdict despite sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could have reached that conclusion; that misdirection entitled the court to quash the murder conviction and order a retrial rather than apply the proviso.
2 Feb 2005
The Magistrate was entitled to reject the defence expert's hypotheses because the factual findings — the appellant's coherent and purposive conduct before and after taking the item, the lack of reliable evidence of an assault or causative head injury, and the appellant's ability to recall timing of medication and alleged events — removed the factual foundation for post‑traumatic automatism or hysterical dissociation; consequently the prosecution proved intent beyond reasonable doubt and the conviction was safe.
7 Jul 2004
The magistrate's factual finding that the appellant had full awareness and did not suffer a total loss of voluntary control was open on the evidence; the medical evidence did not establish automatism and the prosecution proved awareness beyond reasonable doubt, therefore the conviction stands.
29 Nov 2002
Given the agreed, unarguable facts (bus left the highway, mounted pavement and killed a pedestrian while under control of the first defendant) res ipsa loquitur applied to establish a prima facie case; defendants failed to rebut that inference because medical evidence and witness accounts did not establish a plausible sudden automatism that would excuse responsibility; therefore defendants were negligent and liable for the death; contributory negligence did not apply.
6 Mar 1998
The convictions were quashed because the evidence showed the appellant was lapsing into unconsciousness during the period of detention so that the prosecution failed to prove he knew he was under arrest and thus could not have formed the intent to resist, and it was doubtful he acted recklessly to cause the damage; consequently the convictions were unsafe and set aside.
31 Jan 1997
The magistrate was entitled to reject automatism because the psychiatric evidence showed only a short‑lived confusional episode and partial amnesia, not total loss of voluntary control, and the appellant retained sufficient control and awareness (demonstrated by the telephone call and deliberate repeated blows) to support findings of intentional conduct; the undisclosed reading of prior reports did not establish prejudicial influence on the magistrate's findings.
20 Aug 1996
The magistrate lawfully preferred the prosecution witness and his factual findings were not vitiated by legal error; the psychiatrist's opinion was of scant value because it rested on false or incomplete facts; therefore the convictions were properly upheld and the appeal dismissed.
21 Sept 1995
Appeal allowed because the trial judge materially misdirected the law by relying on a common‑law presumption of intent contrary to s.65A and by placing the legal burden on the defendant to prove lack of intent/automatism on the balance of probabilities; those errors rendered the evaluation of the defence improper and the convictions and sentences unsafe and therefore must be set aside.
21 Aug 1992
The court held that the judge was correct both in law and fact: automatism predicated on voluntary ingestion of alcohol (including hypoglycaemia arising from that) is not available as a defence to attempted rape (a basic intent offence) and, alternatively, the evidence (lay and expert) did not establish the required evidential foundation to leave non-insane automatism to the jury.
13 Apr 1982
The Court upheld the sentences as not manifestly excessive: the judge lawfully treated mitigating factors as of limited weight given the seriousness of the offence, was entitled to disbelieve unreliable/hostile evidence and to conclude there was no sufficient evidence of drug-induced automatism; therefore an individually deterrent sentence on a first offender was proper and the appeal was dismissed.