12 Jun 2019
BL75(1) prescribes the quorum for the Legislative Council when meeting as the plenary legislative body; it does not apply to meetings of a committee of the whole Council, which are governed by the Council's Rules of Procedure; accordingly the amendment to Rule 17(1) reducing the committee quorum to 20 was not shown to be unlawful and the judicial review was dismissed.
15 Feb 2019
The Court held the NPCSC Interpretation was valid, binding and retrospective; applying BL104, the ODO and the Interpretation the appellant’s conduct objectively failed the Exact Form and Content and Solemnity requirements and thus amounted to declining or neglecting to take the LegCo oath; the consequence is immediate disqualification and no right to retake the oath; the appeal is dismissed.
22 Aug 2018
The Court refused leave because the appellant, seeking to adduce fresh expert evidence on appeal, failed to satisfy the primary Ladd v Marshall requirement by not adducing the evidence below despite awareness of relevant authorities; the questions raised were interlocutory, fact-sensitive and not of great general or public importance nor reasonably arguable, so leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was not warranted and costs were awarded to the respondents.
22 Aug 2018
The Court refused leave because the appellant, applying to adduce fresh expert evidence on appeal, failed the first Ladd v Marshall requirement by not adducing the evidence earlier without good reason (notably after knowing of relevant authority); the questions raised were fact‑sensitive, not of great general or public importance, and not reasonably arguable; accordingly leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was refused.
1 Sept 2017
Leave to appeal was refused because, although the issues raised are of public importance, there is no reasonably arguable case to disturb the findings below: the courts are obliged to determine compliance with BL104; the factual findings that the applicants declined or neglected to take the oath are unassailable; section 21 operates to disqualify in those circumstances; and the NPCSC Interpretation is binding and consistent with that outcome.
16 Jan 2017
Leave to appeal was refused because, although the questions raised were of public importance, the applicants failed to show reasonable prospects of success: the non-intervention argument was unarguable as it would oust the courts' constitutional duty to adjudicate article 104 compliance; the NPCSC Interpretation is a binding legislative interpretation under article 158 that can supplement and be retrospective; vacation under s21 operates automatically; and the Chief Executive had locus in the circumstances.
16 Jan 2017
Leave to appeal refused because, although the questions raised are of great public importance, they have no reasonable prospects of success: the non‑intervention principle cannot displace courts' constitutional duty to adjudicate compliance with Basic Law art 104; NPCSC interpretations under art 158 are binding, can supplement law and operate retrospectively; vacation under s21 is automatic; and the Chief Executive has locus in these proceedings; accordingly the Court of Appeal refused leave.
21 Oct 2011
The court held that Article 26 must be read in the full context of the Basic Law, its related articles (notably Articles 45 and 68), the Annexes, the 1990 Explanation and the constitutional history; on that contextual, mosaic reading sections 25 and 26 of the Legislative Council Ordinance permitting corporate voting are not inconsistent with the Basic Law and the applicants' contrary argument is not reasonably arguable, therefore leave to appeal is refused.
21 Oct 2011
Leave to appeal was refused because the Court concluded the alternative reading of Article 26 (as creating an inalienable personal right excluding any non‑permanent resident participation) was not reasonably arguable; on the proper contextual construction of Article 26 together with Articles 45, 68 and Annexes I and II, sections 25 and 26 of the Legislative Council Ordinance permitting corporate voting in functional constituencies are not inconsistent with the Basic Law.
7 Dec 2010
Corporate voting in functional constituencies under ss.25 and 26 of the Legislative Council Ordinance is not unconstitutional: Article 26 does not, properly construed in its context and purpose, prohibit the legislature from allowing corporate participation in functional constituency elections; the Basic Law and its Annexes, the legislative history and the principle of gradual and orderly progress support corporate voting; the discrimination claim fails because the franchise for functional constituencies is designed to represent sectoral stakeholders rather than to privilege property owners.