13 Dec 2005
The magistrate lawfully found on the evidence that the water pipes were adapted for causing injury (based on design, gauze-wrapped handles and lengths); any comment about intention was surplusage and, if unsupported, ought to be disregarded; therefore the conviction was properly sustained and the appeal fails.
29 Apr 1998
The magistrate's factual findings that the appellant was observed carrying the baseball bat, that the bat and knives were offensive weapons in the circumstances, and that the admission of triad membership was voluntary were entitled to deference and not open to interference on appeal; therefore the conviction is upheld.
22 May 1992
The court held that because the medical reports did not establish the statutory threshold of a 'mentally disordered person' as required by s.45(1)(b) and s.46(1) (including the requirement for a government medical officer's opinion), a hospital order could not be made; further, the medical evidence did not establish a causal link between the brain tumour and the offending sufficient to mitigate the sentence, and consequently the sentences imposed (total 5 years and 9 months) were not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle, so the application for leave to appeal against sentence was dismis…
11 Jul 1991
The conviction was unsafe because the magistrate failed to give proper weight to uncontradicted independent evidence that the appellant had been the subject of a one‑sided unprovoked assault and was entitled to act in reasonable self‑defence; consequently the magistrate's adverse findings and acceptance of police opinion about intent could not be relied upon and the appeal must be allowed.
2 Feb 1989
Although baseball bats are not offensive weapons per se, in the factual circumstances the defendant possessed them as instruments fit for unlawful purposes with intent to use them for a fight; the magistrate erred in finding no case to answer and should have amended the charge under s.27 and continued the trial.
3 May 1984
Leave to appeal against sentence out of time was refused because no substantial grounds were shown; on application of MO Kwong-sang tariff the appropriate sentence for the robbery would have been about nine years but the district judge was limited to the statutory maximum of seven years so that is what should have been imposed.
3 May 1983
Possession of the car key coupled with the appellant's conduct and failure to give a satisfactory explanation permitted the magistrate to infer knowledge of the weapons and sustain the conviction under section 17.
2 Jul 1982
A magistrate is not entitled to decline to proceed on a charge proved before him on the ground that a different statute would have been more appropriate; prosecutorial discretion to select charges is for the Attorney General alone; under s.33(1) Public Order Ordinance proof that an article is suitable for causing injury suffices and intention to use it need not be proven, though intention is relevant to lawful authority or reasonable excuse; on the proved facts the magistrate erred in dismissing the charge.
20 Sept 1979
Magistrate erred in law: s94A(4) places the burden of proving lawful authority or reasonable excuse on the defendant; the exhibited melon knife was 'suitable' for causing injury and thus an 'offensive weapon' under the Public Order Ordinance; the English per se distinction is inapplicable in Hong Kong; the acquittal resulted from those misdirections though the court exercised discretion to remit with opinion rather than order a retrial.
11 Jun 1968
Section 17 is best construed as contemplating two categories (any spear, bludgeon or other offensive weapon; and any crowbar, picklock, skeleton-key or other instrument fit for unlawful purposes) with the alternatives 'with intent to use' or 'is unable to give a satisfactory account' applying to both categories; where the prosecution concedes inability to prove intent and the article is not manifestly incriminatory, a charge that assumes intent is defective. On the facts, the prosecution could not prove intent and the charge did not disclose an offence, so the acquittal was rightly entered an…