2 Nov 2021
Leave to appeal against conviction refused because the Court found the judge's directions on duress and the evidence were legally adequate and not reasonably arguable; leave to appeal against sentence granted because the judge applied sentencing guidelines that were not in existence at the time of the offence, making the sentence issue reasonably arguable.
20 Jan 2020
The leave judge concluded it was reasonably arguable that the prosecutor may have acted improperly in not calling Hoque, that the defence strategy to admit and attack his s65B statement was prompted by that refusal, and that the judge's directions risked permitting impermissible hearsay inferences; accordingly leave to appeal was granted on grounds 1–3 (and limited leave on a redacted form of ground 4).
21 Mar 2016
Leave to appeal was refused because the officers were lawfully entitled to demand identity and to pursue the applicant to his unit; the applicant's conduct justified restraint and arrest and entry to the room; even if there had been illegality that would not automatically exclude the drugs; the trial judge properly directed the jury on the hostile witness and on credibility matters, leaving factual determinations to the jury.
29 Nov 2005
The convictions were unsafe because prosecuting counsel improperly cross-examined the 1st accused on his antecedent statement, the trial judge misdirected the jury on how to approach defence evidence (failing to instruct that defence evidence creating reasonable doubt requires acquittal) and failed to give an appropriate cut-throat defence direction; those cumulative errors warranted quashing the convictions and ordering retrials.
23 Dec 1997
Although the trial judge properly exercised discretion in admitting the verbals and was not plainly wrong on that point, several misdirections—inviting speculative inferences about keyboard ownership, minimizing the significance of women’s clothing, and inviting speculation about the doormat from a photograph—cumulatively rendered the convictions unsafe; the proviso could not be invoked, and the convictions and sentences were therefore set aside.
15 Nov 1994
The Court held that the deputy judge correctly directed the jury that s47 of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance raised a presumption of knowledge which the accused had to rebut on the balance of probabilities, and that the prosecution retained the burden of proving intention to traffic beyond reasonable doubt; the alleged confusing language did not amount to a misdirection warranting leave to appeal, so the application was refused.