7 Sept 2021
Leave to appeal was refused because none of the applicant’s grounds disclosed a reasonably arguable case: the jury were not pressured (no enforced time limit), the shoulder‑bag issue was fully addressed and left to the jury, and the telephone point was not pursued at trial so cannot form a basis for appeal.
23 Apr 2021
On the uncontested evidence and expert proof the flat was a functioning cocaine production laboratory with substantial reagents and tools and the applicant's conduct (misleading statements, failure to attend meetings, and immediate departure to the Mainland) was incompatible with innocence; the trial judge's directions to the jury were correct and fair; therefore the conviction was safe. On sentencing, the manufacture constituted a continuous, mid‑scale operation falling within the guideline that such cases attract sentences not less than 20 years, so the 20‑year sentence was appropriate and…
22 Sept 2020
The court granted leave to appeal against sentence on two arguable grounds: (1) it is open to debate whether the manufacturing starting point must be inflexibly fixed at 1.6–1.8 times the trafficking starting point in cases involving very large quantities; and (2) it is arguable that the sentence for count 1 should not necessarily be ordered to run consecutively with counts 2 and 4 given the differences in location and circumstances of seizure.
6 Jul 2020
The available circumstantial evidence—applicant's tenancy, his DNA and fingerprints in multiple locations/items in the flat where manufacture was occurring, and his immediate flight and prolonged absence—allowed a reasonable and irresistible inference of participation in drug manufacture; the jury was properly directed and the 20-year sentence was not manifestly excessive, so leave to appeal against conviction and sentence is refused.
11 Jul 2013
The Court refused leave because the trial judge’s directions were proper and comprehensive, the prosecution evidence was sufficient to support convictions for manufacture and trafficking, the applicants’ grounds lacked merit and were perfunctory or speculative, and the 2nd applicant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation or a substantial arguable ground for an out‑of‑time appeal.
5 Oct 2012
Leave to appeal out of time was refused because the applicant offered no cogent explanation for the more than four year delay, the proposed grounds were not substantial or plainly arguable given the facts established at trial (manufacture properly found and not a mere case of personal use), and the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive in light of precedent and the seriousness of manufacture.
11 Jul 2012
The Court held the judge erred by using the defendant's manufacture of crack cocaine — conduct amounting to a more serious uncharged offence — to justify an elevated starting point; applying the proper approach to the charged offences produced a starting point of 9 years, reduced by one third for guilty pleas to 6 years concurrent per count.
9 Mar 2011
The Court held the conviction was safe: the judge legitimately inferred acts preparatory to manufacture from the applicant's occupation and control of the premises and substances, his request that Wu bring ingredients and evidence of use and a recipe found in the apartment; the sentence of 4.5 years was not manifestly excessive because the judge properly started from the established six-year starting point for manufacturing and applied a 25% discount for mitigation.
3 Sept 2009
The trial judge's directions were overall adequate for the first applicant and his conviction and sentence are upheld. Although the judge ought to have directed the jury that the first applicant's admissions were not evidence against the second applicant, the appellate court applied the proviso and concluded that a reasonable properly directed jury would inevitably have convicted the second applicant on the evidence; accordingly both applicants' convictions and sentences were affirmed.
29 Nov 2007
The charge of manufacturing was misapplied in circumstances where the defendant's acts were a technical preparation of drugs for personal consumption; manufacturing charges should be reserved for trafficking contexts and not used to enhance sentences for simple possession; therefore the manufacturing conviction/sentence was quashed and substituted with nominal sentences already served, entitling the appellant to immediate release.