27 Oct 2016
Although the prosecution proved the appellant dealt with funds and proved knowledge that the funds were proceeds of an indictable offence, the charge of conspiracy failed because there was no evidence of an agreement with any other person between 15 and 16 January 2013; absence of proof of agreement (an essential element of conspiracy) required quashing of the conviction.
10 Nov 2014
The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction because the trial and appellate courts applied an unduly narrow and improperly framed test: they both excluded relevant 'grounds' consisting of the accused's perceptions and evaluations and the Court of Appeal's adoption of a 'could believe' standard was wrong in the criminal context; the correct approach requires considering the grounds known to the accused (including his perceptions and evaluations) and applying a standard that those grounds would lead a reasonable person to the requisite belief.
31 May 2013
The phrase 'having reasonable grounds to believe' requires an objective assessment by a common‑sense reasonable person of the facts that were known to the defendant (subjective knowledge of those facts), but does not permit importing the defendant's subjective processing or beliefs; the proper approach is to identify the facts known to the defendant and then ask whether those facts would give reasonable grounds to believe the property represented proceeds of an indictable offence; on the facts the required grounds existed and the defendant knew them, so conviction was upheld.
13 Jun 2012
The Vice‑President held the trial judge erred in law by failing to attribute the defendant's specific knowledge of his relationship with Kwok to the hypothetical reasonable person and by treating mere suspicion or wilful blindness regarding a large, unexplained receipt as equivalent to reasonable grounds to believe the funds were proceeds of an indictable offence; on that basis the appeal had a reasonable prospect of success and bail pending appeal was granted.